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ABSTRACT

This study compares environmental policy in the United States and
Japan through an analysis of the Clean Air Acts in both countries. As the U.S.
and Japan are both constitutional democracies with similar economic goals,
and the environmental policies of the U.S. and Japan are very similar, the
difference in the implementation of environmental regulations is compared by
analyzing the separate relationships between business and government in
each country. The paper examines the Clean Air Acts of 1970 in both Japan
and the U.S, and compares the success of this legislation in terms of industrial
compliance and emissions reduction. The examination suggests that Japan has
been more successful in its implementation of environmental regulations due to
the Japanese bureaucracy's ability to control the formulation of pollution laws
and direct their implementation in a cooperative effort with industry. Alternately,
environmental policy making and its implementation in the U.S. is characterized
by an adversarial relationship between business and government which is
compounded by a political system that lacks the institutional strength to
effectively implement environmental policies. The study suggests market based
incentives as a means by which to approach environmental policy and achieve
private sector compliance in the U.S.
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A COM PARATIVE STUDY OF ENVIRO NM ENTAL POLICY:
TH E U N ITE D STATES AND JAPAN

IN T R O D U C T IO N
G O V E R N M E N T - IN D U S T R Y R E L A T IO N S A N D E N V IR O N M E N T A L
P O L IC Y :
T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S A N D JA P A N

Over the past two decades environmental regulation has become a
significant factor affecting industrial policy. In every industrialized nation
businesses have had to confront an increase in environmental standards in all
levels of production.1 W hether business activities involve the extraction or use
of natural resources, processing operations, manufacture of final products, the
packaging and sale of consumer and industrial goods, or the eventual disposal
of goods and wastes, they are no longer conducted without some attention to
environmental consequences.2
The United States and Japan provide an interesting comparison of
environmental regulations and their implementation. Japan and the U.S. are
both constitutional democracies which share similar democratic principles. The
United States and Japan are also highly industrialized democracies with
capitalist market economies and are both committed to economic growth as a
national priority. Furthermore, during the early 1970's, both governments
responded to public concern about environmental quality with similar
administrative and legislative initiatives. In fact, only in Japan has the entire
direction of environmental policy changed as rapidly over the past twenty years
as it has in the United States.3

1 Rogene Buchholz, Alfred Marcus, James Post, Managing Environmental Issues: A Casebook.
(Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992) p.9.
2 Buchholz, p.9.
3 David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United
States. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986) p.21.
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Although Japan and the U.S share similar political structures and
environmental policies, the difference in their implementation of environmental
regulations provides an interesting comparison. Put simply, Japan has been
able to implement it's environmental regulations more successfully than the
United States. Ironically, the American approach to environmental regulations
is the most rigid and rule oriented to be found in any industrial society.4 The
United States makes more extensive use of uniform standards for emissions
and environmental quality than any other nation.5 Yet, while American
regulations enacted since 1969 impose strict environmental standards on
industry, these regulations have not been implemented as successfully in the
United States as they have in Japan.
The most striking difference between the creation and implementation of
environmental regulations in Japan and the U.S. is related to the separate
relationships between industry and government in each country. The
successful implementation of Japan’s environmental regulations can be
attributed to the bureaucracy's ability to control the formulation of pollution laws
and direct their implementation in a cooperative effort with industry. Alternately,
environmental policy making and its implementation in the U.S. is characterized
by an adversarial relationship between business and government which is
compounded by a political system that lacks the institutional capacity to
effectively implement policies.6 In sum, while it is difficult to make cross-national
comparisons of policy effectiveness, it appears that Japan has been more
successful in its implementation of environmental regulations due to the
cooperative efforts of Japan's business and government. Consequently, Japan
4 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.21.
5 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.21.
6 David Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations In The United States: An Overview," in Stephen
Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., Comparative Government - Industry Relations: Western Europe.
The United States, and Japan. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) p.91.
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has been more successful in controlling and decreasing pollution.
As Tyson and Zysman state, there is more than one form of capitalism,
more than one way of structuring business-state relations in a democratic
society.7 This is made clear when comparing government-industry relations in
the U.S. and Japan. America’s policy for industry rests on three central
principles: market competition, price driven adjustment, and a government
limited to regulatory functions (essentially guaranteeing corporate management
freedom from outside interference, specifically government interference).8
Zysman states that the arms-length political stance that the U.S. government
takes towards business rests on three structural elements: (1) the apparatus of
the government, which divides powers and makes the system responsive to
particular interest group demands; (2) the court system, which reinforces the
fragmentation of policy and the ability of small groups to influence or block the
government; and (3) the financial system, which stands at arms-length from
both government and business (a securities market-based financial system with
internationally oriented major banks).9 In this system a thousand small battles
must be won before any broad policy can be implemented and secured.10
The U.S. system is, by design, relatively weaker than other industrial
countries. In the United States private groups are able to penetrate the political
decision making process quite easily. The American government is so
vulnerable to interest group pressures that the adoption and implementation of
a coherent and consistent set of policies towards industry is next to

7 Laura Tyson, John Zysman, "Developmental Strategy And Production Innovation In Japan," in
Chalmers Johnson, Laura Tyson, John Zysman, eds., Politics and Productivity: The Real Storv of
Whv Japan Works. (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988) p.60.
8 John Zysman, Governments. Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of
Industrial Change. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) p.266.
9 Zysman, p.262.
10 Zysman, p.268.

5

impossible.11 In addition, the strength of private capital markets in the U.S. and
the autonomy of America's financial institutions leave the government with few
policy instruments through which to influence the economy or industrial policy.
In the American market-based financial system with internationally oriented
major banks, the financial system constrains the government's capacity to
intervene selectively in industry. In this situation the financial system is
decentralized and power is diffused into the market.12 Furthermore, the
separation of powers doctrine, at the core of the American constitution, creates
three government branches that encompass distinctly different responsibilities,
practices and powers. The result of these factors is a relatively weak American
government and little cooperation between business and governm ent.13 Both
aspects stem from American political history, dating back to the Constitutional
Convention and the Founding Fathers' fear of a powerful government,
skepticism towards ties between government and any interest group (including
business), and suspicion of government-business cooperation. As the founders
intended to limit, not enhance, the powers of the state, the central feature of
American politics is the fragmentation and dispersion of power and authority.
The U.S. government's weak role in industry is a consequence of the
political history of America's industrialization. Politics shaped the financial
system in order to block the central government's domination of the economy
and to prevent political domination of industry.14 Furthermore, America was
also an early industrializer; economic change took place slowly and with

11 See Charles Schultze, "Industrial Policy: A Dissent," Brookings Review, Fall 1983; J.L.
Badaracco, and D.B. Yoffie, "Industrial Policy: It Cant Happen Here," Harvard Business Review,
Nov.-Dee. 1982.
12 Zysman, p.269.
13 Richard Boyd, "Government - Industry Relations in Japan: Access, Communication, and
Competitive Collaboration," in Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., Comparative Government
- Industry Relations: Western Europe. The United States, and Japan. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1987) p.92.
14 Zysman, p.269.
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relatively little state direction.15 Compared to other capitalist nations America's
industries grew with relatively little direct government assistance.16 David
Vogel states that because the U.S. government played such a passive role in
shaping industrial development, America's industrial elite developed an
ideology that is highly critical of government intervention.17
In Japan both government policy making and business-government
relations are generally cooperative in nature.18 There exists a series of
linkages and points of access and communication between government and
industry, the effect of which is to integrate the industrial policy community and
facilitate the movement of ideas, the representation of interests and the
formation and implementation of policy.19 Extensive use is made of these
channels by both business and government. There is in fact a long tradition of
close cooperation between government officials and the business community in
Japan. As a late industrializer the Japanese state played a decisive role in
building the economy of Japan. The pattern of state intervention established
during the Meiji restoration of 1868 (during which building the economy was a
primary goal) continues to the present day. Thus, a non-adversarial
relationship between the public and private sector is inherent in the Japanese
state. Furthermore, in Japan, the implementation of industrial policy is
facilitated by a credit-based, industrial financial system which allocates
resources through state influence and policies.20 This credit-based financial
system provides a powerful policy instrument for the Japanese government.
15 Stephen Krasner, "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of
External Strength and Internall Weakness, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and
Plenty: Foreign Economic Politics of Advanced Industrialized States. (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1978),p.62.
16 Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations," p.96.
17 Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations," p.96.
18 Haruhiro Fukui, "Studies in Policy Making: A Review of the Literature," in T.J... Pempel, ed.,
Policy Making in Contemporary Jaoan. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977) p.22-57.
19 Boyd, p.65.
20 Zysman, p.234.

7

Following World W ar II Japan’s bureaucrats were able to manipulate
credit, tax and trade, thereby building a strong economy and facilitating a shift
from agriculture to industry. With these financial tools, the Japanese
bureaucracy provided domestic producers with the support and guidance they
needed to achieve competitive advantages in a global market.21 Many
academics believe that the Japanese bureaucracy, especially The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (M ITI), effectively planned and directed the
transformation of the Japanese economy from its comparatively backward, wartorn condition in the late 1940's to its present status as an industrial giant.22
Several features of Japanese political and historical experience lend credence
to this thesis. Japan is considered a late-developing nation, industrializing later
than much of Europe and North America. Late developing states, modern
political economic theory suggests, tend to establish strong, intrusive
bureaucracies, which deliberately put into place the economic infrastructure that
emerged more or less spontaneously in nations that developed earlier.23
Japan is nearly always classified as a "strong state," and the influence of late
development on Japanese economic institutions has been the theme of many
influential studies.24 In sum, it is generally accepted that most of the ideas for
economic growth in the post W W II period came from the bureaucracy, and the
business community responded to these ideas in a dependent manner. This
tradition of business-government cooperation in Japan continues to remain in
place to the present day.
In contrast to the United States, centralization is also found in Japan's
private sector. Specifically, the separation of large and small firms is bridged in
21 David Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in
Japan. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.3.
22 Friedman, p.3.
23 Friedman, p.3.
24 Friedman, p.4.
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Japan, as a large proportion of small firms are subcontractors of larger
corporations.25 Organizational unity is assured by an elaborate network of
overlapping peak associations dominated by the larger corporations; this
arrangement creates a large degree of centralization within the business
community 26 Furthermore, inter-firm trade in Japan is dominated by long
standing networks of reciprocal ties among companies. These networks are
evident when they become formalized as identifiable Keiretsu, or industrial
groupings 27 The Keiretsu provide for their members reliable sources of
borrowed capital as well as a stable core of long-term shareholders. Moreover,
they establish a particularly internalized market in intermediate products,
particularly in trade in raw materials and industrial products 28 Within the
Keiretsu, trade, finance, corporate control, and thus firms, become closely inter
linked. These inter-firm groups or 'Keiretsu' linkages further integrate the
industrial constituency and provide a flow of ideas in both directions: from and
to key bureaucratic agencies. The bureaucratic penetration and control of these
networks is substantial. In addition, the limited number of Japanese commercial
banks are similarly centralized, as they are all directly tied to the Bank of Japan
with its monopoly power to regulate the supply of cred it29 Industrial policy in
Japan is primarily formulated within a triangle consisting of government
bureaucrats, major companies, and banks. Within this triangle formal and
informal consultation is the norm, rather than the exception.
Although both the U.S. and Japan are highly industrialized market-based

25 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Politics of Advanced
Industrialized States. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p.315.
26 Katzenstein, p.315.
27 Michael Gerlach, "Keiretsu Organization in the Japanese Economy: Analysis and Trade
Implications, in Chalmers Johnson, Laura Tyson, and John Zysman, eds., Politics and
Productivity: The Real Storv of Why Japan Works. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1989),
p .142.
28 Gerlach, p. 142.
29 Katzenstein, p.315.

9
democracies that share similar economic goals, clearly the relationship
between government and industry takes on a very separate character in each
nation. While the firms in Japan consider government purposes in their
strategies and inform and often negotiate with the government concerning their
actions, this is not the case in the fragmented and separated U.S. system. As
Peter Katzenstein states,

The lack of differentiation between state and society is a feature of the
Japanese situation which facilitates policy implementation. In contrast
to America, relations between business and the state are so symbiotic
that it is virtually impossible to determine where one stops and the
other begins. Multiple connections e x is t. . . linking business, the LDP,
and the state bureaucracy.30

In these distinctly separate arenas the implementation of similar environmental
regulations takes on an extremely separate nature, and thus achieves different
results. For the purpose of this study we will focus specifically on air pollution
because air pollution has been the most salient environmental problem in the
United States and Japan since 1970, and is similar in content in both
countries.31
The differences between the Japanese and American regulatory policies
are not confined to environmental regulation. Environmental policy can be
used as a basis for generalizing about the politics and administration of
government regulation in both countries 32 Thus, this study of national
regulatory styles not only compares different approaches to environmental
policy, but also provides a useful way of exploring the relationship between
t

business and government in both Japan and the United States.

30 Katzenstein, p.315.
31 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p. 151.
32 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.27.

CHAPTER

I

E N V IR O N M E N T A L P O L IC Y IN T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S :
A IR A C T

T H E C LE A N

In the United States widespread public concern for environmental
conditions escalated during the 19 60’s. In many ways the emerging
environmental movement was a successor to the civil rights and anti-war
movements of the 1960's. Prior to this decade, the common perception was that
human activities could not impose permanent or substantial environmental
dam age, let alone present health problems.33

However, in the early 1960’s

many environmental crises appeared and were publicly recognized: thick and
harmful smog in several cities such as Los Angeles, the “death” of many lakes
and rivers due to severe contamination, as well as publicized health problems
specifically attributed to toxic wastes.34 Environmental pressure groups, aided
by strong public support and substantial media attention, combined to exert
considerable pressure on the government to enact significant environmental
legislation. This “environmental movement” resulted in the enactment of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Under NEPA, Congress set
forth comprehensive national environmental policy guidelines for the first time.
In the early 1970's many more environmental laws were enacted, such as The
Clean Air Act, The Clean W ater Act, and Superfund (designed to clean up toxic
waste sites). Along with the introduction of environmental policies, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in 1970 to deal with
33 Charles Howe, "An Evaluation of United States Air and Water Policies," Environment, Sept.
1991, p.11.
34 Howe, p.11.
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this new legislation.
The Clean Air Act of 1970 established extensive and stringent pollution
regulations, and thus marked the beginning of the present era of pollution
control policy.35 The six main points of the Clean Air act included:

1) Uniform national ambient air quality standards were to be set by the
EPA to protect public health and welfare. These uniform standards
applied to all U.S. states.36
2) Uniform national standards of performance for new industry were to
be established.37
3) National emission standards for hazardous air pollutants were to be
established by the EPA and would apply to existing as well as to new
industrial plants. Arsenic, asbestos, benzene, beryllium,
radionuclides, and vinyl chloride have all been designated as
hazardous according to section 112 of the act.
4) Uniform restrictions on emissions from new motor vehicles were to be
set.
5) Citizens were permitted to take legal action against any person,
including the U.S. government and the EPA, alleged to be in violation
of either emission standard.
6) A 30 million dollar research program was initiated to assess the
causes and effects of noise pollution on public health and welfare.38
The objective of this program was to reduce environmental noise to
below a level at which there is a risk of hearing damage.

The Clean Air Act set a precedent for strong environmental legislation, and was
intended to protect people and property from the hazardous effects of air
pollution. However, the enactment of legislation is only a small part of the
process towards achieving environmental clean up. Legislation must be
applied effectively following its enactment: unfortunately, this was not the case
in the United States. The Clean Air Act originally required the nation’s air to be
clean by 1975.

However, this proved impossible, as the Clean Air Act's

standards and deadlines were substantially relaxed in a series of
35 Carolyn Adams, Hugh Heclo, Arnold Heidenheimer, Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of
Social Choice in America. Europe, and Japan. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990) p. 166.
36 This act allowed states to set more stringent standards if they wished to do so.
37 The New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) have been diluted and often revised by the
EPA since 1971.
38 The findings of this study resulted in the Noise Control Act of 1972.
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am endm ents.39
In an attempt to postpone the costs of installing controls, industry worked
to postpone compliance dates set by the Clean Air Act.40 Although progress
was made in reducing some pollutants, industry’s efforts resulted in holding
deadlines more than anything else. Increasing pressure for the relaxation of
strict deadlines and standards eventually resulted in the Clean Air Amendments
of 1977. As a result of these Clean Air Act Amendments automobile emission
standards were suspended until 1980-81, and many original standards simply
becam e research objectives 41 According to Etsom, “with most areas of the
country in 1977 not having attained the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for at least one pollutant, extensions to the deadlines were inevitable.”42

The

ability of industry to use loopholes in the law to retard cleanup, in addition to the
steady increase in the use of energy, m ade certain that emissions would rise in
the future, and they did 43
The primary goal of a clean atmosphere remained largely the same, but
the once stringent deadlines for achieving this were abandoned. Certainly
industrial compliance relies largely upon the administrative agency in charge of
achieving compliance. However, the Environmental Protection Agency did not
possess enough power to be anything but flexible in its administration of the
Clean Air Act, especially towards new industry.

By 1982 some regions of the

United States had met the set limits for a number of the targeted pollutants.
However, most parts of the U.S. had failed to attain the standards set for carbon

39 Derek Elsom, Atmospheric Pollution: Causes. Effects, and Control Policies. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Inc., 1987) p. 164.
40 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States
1955-1985. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987) p.76.
41 Hays, p. 171.
42 Elsom, p.164.
43 Hays, p.76.
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monoxide, particulate matter, smog, NOx, SOx and chlorofluorocarbons.44
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments again extended deadlines for
emission standards for a long list of pollutants, but they also established tighter
pollution standards for ozone (smog), carbon monoxide and particulate matter,
and attempted to extensively address the problems of acid rain and energy
efficiency.45 Almost immediately, industry pushed for, and achieved, a federal
regulation that drastically weakened the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 46
This new rule allowed manufacturers to exceed atmospheric emission limits by
as much as 245 tons of pollutants a year, merely by applying for a waiver of the
limits 47 After being lobbied heavily by industry, this regulation was adopted by
Vice President Dan Quayle’s business oriented Council On Competitiveness.
Following the 1970 Clean Air Act and the 1977 and 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments there have been perpetual debates, litigation, hearings, and
proposals regarding further changes to the Clean Air Act. The private sector
continually argues for more leniency in the Clean Air Act, as it believes that the
cost of meeting stringent environmental goals is far too high. Industry argues
that these costs have contributed to unemployment, inflation, a reduction in
productivity, and the decline in U.S. competitiveness in world trade.
Environmental groups and lobbies alternately argue the significance of strong
environmental regulations, and debate the actual cost of environmental clean
up. As a result of the many opposing forces between industry, the government,
and environmental groups, the initially intended goals of environmental
legislation, specifically the Clean Air Act in this case, have not been met.

44 Hays, p.76.
45 United States EPA, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 Summary Materials. (Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, 1990) p.1-5.
46 Tom Wicker, "An Environmental President," Audubon, Sept. 1992, p.44.
47 Wicker, p.44.
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The Economics of Pollution Control In The United States
An important factor to address when discussing pollution and private
sector compliance towards environmental regulations is the economic benefits
offered by pollution. W hen a factory emits wastes into the atmosphere, it is
disposing of its wastes by the cheapest means available. The act of polluting
the air keeps the price of its products lower than they would be if expensive
control methods were used. As a consequence, the industry sells more
products, thereby making more profits. Consequently, the consumers of the
products buy them at a lower price. Thus, the pollution problems that presently
exist are in part explainable by society’s desire for consumer products, as well
as its desire to buy these products at the lowest short term market price.48
Pollution, in economic terms, is considered an "externality” of the market
system. Externalities defined, "are the costs or benefits of a transaction that are
incurred or received by other members of the society but not taken into account
by the parties to the transaction."49 Put simply, those who are making use of the
atmosphere for waste disposal, generally industry, are not paying for its use. In
actuality they are passing the costs, specifically the consequences of pollution,
including the monetary costs, onto society in general. Pollution can be costly to
the general public in a variety of ways. Illnesses and health care connected
with pollution involve the costs of medical care and treatment, not to mention the
obvious costs of poor health to individuals. Additionally, air pollution adversely
affects soil, water, agriculture, wild life, man made structures, and the weather.
The effects of pollution upon these many factors are varied and costly. Even if
the costs of pollution were not serious, which in fact they are, the simple
purchase of an air conditioner by an individual to keep smoke or exhaust out of

48 Adams et. al., p.313.
49 Paul Courant, Richard Lipsey, Douglas Purvis, Peter Steiner, Microeconomics 10th Edition.
(New York, NY: Haper Collins College Publishers, 1993) p.403.
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their house is a cost paid for by the public as a result of industrial "free riding."
In a free market economic system a harmful externality, such as pollution,
is considered a "failure of the market."50 Still, one of the most frequent criticisms
made by U.S. industry concerning pollution control regulations is that the high
cost of compliance leads to plant closures and curtailments, which in turn
causes unemployment. A car bumper sticker expresses this perception, “Are
You Poor, Hungry, Out Of Work: Eat An Environmentalist.”51

It is argued that

the expensive pollution control equipment which companies have to purchase,
install, and maintain in order to meet environmental regulations and decrease
pollution, leads to many plant closures. Thus, the private sector argues that the
financial costs of pollution abatement are simply too great.
Between January 1971 and June 1981, the Environmental Protection
Agency identified 153 closures in firms of 25 or more workers, totaling 32,611
workers who lost their jobs supposedly due to environmental regulation 52
However, the EPA found that environmental regulation was only one of the
reasons for these closures. Many firms had closed their older, inefficient or
obsolete plants, simply for the reasons that they were old and obsolete 53
Furthermore, up to 40 percent of these layoffs were re-hired by their original
companies at other plants. In comparison to these rather small numbers, the
Reagan Administration’s 1982 budget cuts alone led to the unemployment of
one million people in both the public and private sectors.
Pollution abatement costs for industries are indeed substantial.
However, these costs should be compared with the amount of money saved in
wages and productivity which would be lost due to health problems caused by

50 Courant et. al., p.403.
51 Elsom, p. 174.
52 K.L. Grossman, "Job Taker or Job Maker?" Environment, Spring 1982, p.43.
53 G. R. Harris, “Positive Impacts of Environmental Policy on Business in the U.S.," International
Environmental Studies, Spring 1981, p.75.
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air pollution. One must consider the monetary benefits of reduced medical
treatment, as well as less dam age to buildings, crops and forest areas. In 1976
Senator Edmund Muskie, sponsor of the Clean Air Act, claimed that 15,000
deaths per year, as well as 15 million days of restricted activity per year,
occurred as a result of air pollution.54 Furthermore, many argue that, the
number of jobs lost compared with those gained in the growing industry of
pollution control is small. It has been estimated that between .5 and 1.1 million
people are employed in public and private pollution control industries.55
There are many scientists and economists who believe that proper waste
disposal and anti-pollution technologies can serve to create jobs rather than
destroy them. Furthermore, environmental research and technology designed
to preserve the environment offers limitless economic opportunities. If devices
were to be redesigned to operate more efficiently new markets would open up
for these more efficient products. Perhaps millions of refrigerators and air
conditioners, both which emit chlorofluorocarbons, would eventually need to be
replaced. In turn the opportunity for development, production, and sales of new
refrigerators and air conditions would be enormous. This fact is a basic
economic precept. W hile Japan is working on just such innovations, the United
States is now importing most of its air pollution control devices and equipment
from Japan.56
The current Clinton Administration, and those administrations that will
follow, have the challenge of continuing to clean the air and improving the
environmental quality while simultaneously encouraging economic growth.
Industrialists and environmentalists will continue to argue the significance of
these two goals, and each group will of course attempt to shift the balance of

54 Elsom, p. 190.
55 Grossman, p. 43.
56 Grossman, p.46.
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success in their favor. The present debate on industrial policy under the Clinton
Administration does include plans to achieve a better balance between
environmental and economic objectives, and encourages a more cooperative
effort between business and government concerning environmental policy.
However, President Clinton's plans involve little new legislation, new spending,
or new research proposals. Furthermore, they are all "suggested policies,"
lacking any real incentives for compliance or deterrents to non-compliance.
Interestingly, the Japanese government has succeeded in achieving
what the United States private sector claims is impossible. Japan has
drastically improved the quality of their environment, specifically their air quality,
while not only maintaining their strong economic situation, but experiencing
economic growth. In fact, Japan’s gains in efficiency during the 1970’s and
19 80’s were so great that it now uses just 50 percent of the resources (materials
and energy) that the U.S. does to produce one unit of GNP; this is said to
translate into a 5 percent cost advantage on products.57
In summary, it is clear that American air pollution remains a major
problem, and that it has profound implications in terms of health, economic well
being, as well as the preservation of natural resources and surroundings.
Furthermore, the large amount of air pollutants from American sources are
contributing significantly to world air pollution, and may play a major role in
changing world climate patterns as well. It can be argued that the United
States, a nation that holds six percent of the worlds population, yet consumes
annually over 35 percent of the world’s resources, generating proportionate
burdens of harmful wastes, should indeed take some global environmental
responsibilities. Unfortunately, as a result of many opposing forces between
industry, the government, and interest groups, substantial progress has not

57 Emily Smith, “Growth Versus The Environment,” Business Week, May 11,1992, p.69.
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been made in the area of air pollution or other environmental goals in the U.S.,
specifically when compared to Japan's progressive record.

CHAPTER II
E N V IR O N M E N T A L P O L IC Y IN J A P A N :

T H E C LE A N A IR A C T

In order to understand the process and consequences of policy-making
in Japan, specifically environmental regulation, it is first necessary to examine
the history and framework of the Japanese political system. Japan has a long
tradition of institutionally separating the functions of those who reign and those
who rule, clearly distinguishing between sovereign authority and political
power.58 Following the Tokugawa pattern of imperial reign and feudal rule, the
Meiji Constitution of 1889 placed sovereignty in the Emperor, but ratified a
political structure that allowed the majority of political power to be held by the
national bureaucracy.59 Similarly, Japan’s revamped constitution of 1947
(modeled on the American Democratic system) places sovereignty in the
National Diet as representative of the people, but gives the bureaucracy the
responsibility of formulating and implementing legislation.60 Frank Upham
states that, "the national bureaucracy remains one of the preeminent political
groups in Japan, essentially dominating the Diet in both the formulation and
implementation of policy."61 Chalmers Johnson similarly contends that "in
Japan politicians reign but the bureaucrats rule."62
Furthermore, Japan’s political system is generally described as a

58 Frank Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1987) p. 14.
59 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
60 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
61 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
62 Chalmers Johnson, MITI And The Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy. 19251975. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
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triumvirate consisting of the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), top
business management, and elite bureaucrats.63 These three groups are not
only tightly interlocked, both politically and socially, but economically
interdependent as well.64

Upham states,

The LDP politicians posses supreme formal authority: during periods of
severe inter-ministerial conflict or great political sensitivity this formal
authority becomes important politically, but in ordinary times the
government of Japan is firmly in the hands of the bureaucracy.”65

Typically, the Diet’s legislative role consists of passing bills drafted by the
bureaucracy. The bureaucrats have the uppermost role of both formulating as
well as implementing policy. This of course applies to environmental policy,
and possibly serves as the root of Japan’s success with environmental
regulations.
Following World W ar II the Japanese government's primary commitment
was to economic growth and the transformation of the economic base from
agriculture and light industry to heavy industry 66 In order to achieve this rapid
industrial development the Japanese government promoted a technology policy
that was particularly harmful to the environment. The policy of "unbundling"
complex technology allowed producers to set up the minimum technological
core necessary for a quick, cheap start of operations.67 This policy simply
meant that the heavy and chemical industrial plants, which did not have
pollution control safeguards, simply dumped untreated smoke and waste into
the environment.68 As industrialization expanded, more and more pollutants
63 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
64 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
65 Upham, Law and Social Change, p. 14.
66 Tyson et. al., p.67.
67 Koji Taira, "Dialectics of Economic Growth, National Power, and Distributive Struggles," in
Andrew Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan as History. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)
p.171.
68 Taira, p. 171.
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entered the environment. By the 1960's Japan was literally the most polluted
nation in the world.69 In 1970 Dr. Marshal Goldman wrote of Japan's situation,

As a country with perhaps the world's highest and most sustained rate
of economic growth, Japan is a fascinating study not only of rapid
industrialization, but also of the environmental disruption that results
when modernization comes too fast and haphazardly . . . To the visiting
ecologist Japan suggests what might happen the day before the earth
poisons itself to death.70

Japan’s environmental movement was initiated by a series of events in
the m id-1960’s known as the “Big Four” pollution incidents: mercury poisoning
(from the industrial wastes released by the Japan Nitrogen Company) in
M inam ata and Niigata that killed and crippled thousands of people; air
pollution causing asthma and bronchitis in Yokkaich; and cadmium poisoning
in Toyama; which resulted in bone diseases. As the tendency of lawsuits on
behalf of pollution victims increased, they becam e the focus of a large anti
pollution movement in Japan. The government's reaction to this movement was
a substantial turnabout in industrial policy.
Japan's environmental legislation culminated in a remarkable session of
the national Diet in December, 1970 known as the "Pollution Diet." At this
session the national government created The Environment Agency, and passed
over a dozen laws involving pollution control. The Pollution Diet enacted a
series of amendments and new statutes that established Japan as an innovator
in environmental policy and eventually a leader in pollution control.71 Upham
states of the “Pollution Diet,”

Perhaps most indicative of the political mood and the complete reversal
of political and social momentum was the unanimous vote of the Diet to
69 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.29.
70 Marshal Goldman, Ecology and Economics: Controlling Pollution in the 197Q's. (Englewood,
NJ: Prentice Hall Inc., 1972) p.167.
71 Upham, Law and Social Change, p.30.
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eliminate a clause in the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control
of 1967 that limited environmental regulation to that consistent with
economic growth.72

This vote is considered ground breaking in terms of environmental policy, as it
put environmental concerns on equal grounds with economic concerns.
Despite the previously bleak environmental situation, Japan's 1976
report on the state of the environment, submitted at a meeting of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (O E C D ), offered an
impressive record of achievement. This record was all the more impressive
when compared to Japan's depressing 1972 report to the United Nations
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment which revealed Japan's
substantial pollution problems.73 As stated by Fujikura et. al.f the 1976 report
showed that,

In many parts of the country pollution had declined to a remarkable
degree.74 Elsewhere it had been arrested. And in several areas
Japanese industry had met the world’s strictest environmental
standards.75 From an economic perspective, the most striking result of
Japanese pollution control policies, analyzed under three economic
models, was that G N P and employment were practically unaffected.
Foreign observers recalling the dreary Japanese report to the 1972
United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment may
find this transition startling, for W esterners have come to think of Japan,
perhaps as a result of the conference, as a veritable cauldron of
pollution.76

It is important to note that Japan’s economy was not affected by pollution control

72 Upham, Law and Social Change, p.30.
73 Koichiro Fujikura, Julian Gresser, Akio Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan. (Boston: The
MIT Press, 1981) p.229.
74 This is based on the OECD report, "Environmental Policies in Japan.” A report of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1977).
75 Perhaps the clearest index of environmental improvement is the dramatic reduction of S 02
(sulfur dioxide) concentrations since 1967. For example, in 1974, average concentrations were
50 % lower than those in 1967. Concentrations of CO (Carbon Monoxide) also diminished
substantially. All monitoring sites reporting in 1975 registered compliance with the 1975 ambient
air quality standards.
76 Fujikura et. al., p.229.
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efforts, in fact Japan’s economy has seen steady growth despite their success
with pollution controls.77
Japan’s situation is interesting and significant to the study of
environmental policy making for several reasons. First, Japan’s pollution
control efforts have been more effective than measures conducted in the United
States or other W estern countries.78

Furthermore, it is generally believed that

pollution control regulatory policies have been executed more efficiently and
equitably in Japan than comparable U.S. initiatives.79 Michio Hashimoto, the
advisor to Japan’s Environment Agency and president of the Overseas
Environmental Cooperation Center states that, “economic development and
environmental preservation are not conflicting goals.”80 This belief is contrary
to U.S. industry's attitudes towards environmental regulations and economic
growth.
To a large degree, Japan's success with environmental policy can be
traced to their regulatory process and, specifically, industry’s compliance with
environmental regulations. This is due to the fact that Japan’s environmental
policy is built upon an extremely strong business-bureaucracy coalition.
Another significant factor is the bureaucracy's virtual monopoly over the
legislative process in Japan.81 Within these relationships Japan has
successfully combined healthy economic growth with tough pollution controls.

Evidence of Japan’s Success
The Japanese government has succeeded in achieving what the United
States often claims is impossible. Japan has drastically improved the quality of
77 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's Environmental Endeavors," (Tokyo:
Kasumigasei Chiyoda-ku,1992) p.4.
78 Fujikura et. al., p. 229.
79 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.2.
80 The Environment Agency of Japan, “Economic Development and the Environment: The
Japanese Experience,” (Tokyo, Japan: Kasumigasei Chiyoda-ku, 1992) p.1.
81 Fujikura et. al., p.230.
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its environment, specifically the air quality, while maintaining strong economic
growth. In fact, Japan's gains in efficiency during the 1970's and 1980's were
so great that it now uses just 50 percent of the resources (materials and energy)
that the U.S. does to produce one unit of Gross National Product (GNP); this
resource efficiency is said to translate into a 5 percent cost advantage on
products.82
Upon the commencement of Japan’s environmental regulations, Japan
began to achieve great success in energy conservation, specifically in the
industrial sector. As illustrated in figure 2.0, since the early 1970’s energy
efficiency in Japan has continually improved and Japan has achieved the
highest level of energy efficiency among the major industrialized countries.83
Since the first oil crisis, energy consumption per Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in Japan has decreased more rapidly than any other developed country.84
Figure 2.0 illustrates that the volume of energy consumption per G D P is also the
lowest. Adherence to policies concerning energy use, as well as the investment
in new equipment, m ade this possible in Japan. A change in industrial
processes into those which are less energy-demanding and the wide use of
energy efficient consumer products has contributed to Japan's efficient use of
energy.
To deal with air pollution, energy efficiency must be improved by curbing
carbon dioxide emissions caused by energy consumption.

Figure 2.1

demonstrates that Japan emitted far less than half of the carbon dioxide emitted
per capita in the U.S in 1988.85 This fact remains true to the present day.86 The
82 Emily Smith, "Growth Versus the Environment," Business Week, May 11, 1992, p.69.
83 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's Environmental Endeavors," 1992, p.2.
84 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, "Energy Balances of OECD
Countries," (Paris, France: OECD Publications, 1986 & 1987).
85 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, "Environment Data, "1988,
Calculated on the basis of United Nations Energy Statistics.
86 Jacob Schlesinger, “Thinking Green: In Japan Environment Means an Opportunity for New
Technology," The Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1992, p. A10.
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emission of carbon dioxide is generally thought to increase in parallel with the
expansion of economic growth. However, since 1973, Japan has succeeded in
nearly stabilizing energy related carbon dioxide emissions while maintaining
high G N P growth.87 Japan’s commitment to continue its strong pollution control
practices was reinforced when Japan pledged in 1990 to continue to stabilize
carbon dioxide emission over the next decade. The U.S. refused to make such
a commitment.88
The central causes of ozone depletion are chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
and halons used by industries as refrigerants in air conditioners and as
cleansers for electronic parts. At the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the O zone Layer, and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the O zone Layer, the international participants agreed to the total
phase-out of controlled CFC s by the year 2000. The United States did not
agree to this measure, but Japan did.

As of 1986 Japan's consumption of

C F C s and Halons was less than 50 percent that of the United States (S ee Fig.
2 .2 ).89 As of 1992 Japan’s production and consumption of CFCs have been
steadily reduced based on the schedule of the Montreal Protocol: CFC
production has decreased by about 26 percent, and consumption has
decreased by 33 percent in comparison to 1986 levels.90 In order to meet the
deadlines of the Montreal Protocol, M ITI provides low interest loans and tax
incentives to companies that make efforts to recycle and reuse CFC substances,
as well as limit their production of chlorofluorocarbons and halons.91
Furthermore, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry stated in July of

87 OECD, "Environment Data," 1988.
88 Ibid., p.A10.
89 UNEP, Statistical Yearbook, 1986..
90 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.5.
91 The Environment Agency of Japan, "Economic Development and the Environment: The
Japanese Experience," 1992.
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1990 that it was increasing financial help to industries that emit C FC s.92
Acid Rain, an additional result of air pollution, develops when air absorbs
sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) produced by burning fossil fuels.
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, by 1987
acid rain had destroyed over 30 percent of Europe's forests. Acid rain also
acidifies the soil and bodies of water, causing dam age to crops, vegetation, and
fish. Even marble and metal structures are dam aged and eroded by acid rain.
Since 1973, Japan has regulated NO x and SOx emissions from commercial
and industrial sources. According to the Organization for Economic
Development, Japanese environmental standards for SOx and NOx emissions,
as well as for other particles associated with acid rain, are the strictest in the
world.93 Furthermore, as shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4, 76 percent of the world’s
desulfurization and denitrification plants are located in Japan, more than six
times the number of desulfurization plants and twelve times the number of
denitrification plants as in the United States as of 1989 94 Japan’s 2,189
desulfurization and denitrification plants represent the highest number of such
plants in the world.95
Additionally, Japanese companies use enhanced fuels or fuels with low
sulfur levels to meet Japan’s strict standards. As a result of these efforts,
Japan's per capita emissions of SOx and NOx in 1989 were 7.8 percent and 12
percent respectively of U.S. levels, as shown in Figure 2.5. Furthermore, as
illustrated in Figure 2.6, Japan's levels of SOx and NOx emitted from industry
dropped significantly through the 1980's, indicating successful industrial
compliance towards emission regulations. As indicated by figures 2.7 and 2.8,
92 The Environment Agency of Japan, 1992.
93 Organization for Economic Development, Environmental Policies in Japan. (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 1977) p.25.
94 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992, p.7.
95 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992, p.7.
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by 1986 and 1987 Japan’s SOx and N O x emissions were well below U.S.
emission levels.96 As of 1992 Japan's SOx emission level was 4 percent that of
the United States, and the NOx emission level was 6 percent of the U.S. level.97
It seems clear from these statistics that Japan is continually attempting to
strike a balance between economic growth and ecological soundness. Japan’s
Ministry of International Trade and Industry was once entirely focused on
increasing industrial productivity, now it seems to focus on combining sound
economic growth with tough pollution controls. In Japan, Environmental
innovation is gradually becoming linked to industrial competitiveness.

Research and Development in Japan
Japan has put a great deal of money into research to help industry solve
pollution problems. Most of The Ministry of International Trade and Industry's
(M ITI) 50 million dollar global outlays in 1991 went to government-industry
projects to develop environmentally friendly technology.98 Furthermore, M ITI
designed a detailed 100 year blueprint on how to eliminate a variety of
pollutants, and recently opened a new Research Institute of Innovative
Technology for the Earth (RITE); the world’s first commercial environmental
technology institute.99 In 1992 RITE was given a budget of 6.2 billion yen and
additionally received 8,0 00 million yen from local governments and industry,
making RITE the largest project ever launched by M IT I.100 MITI has also set up
the International Center for Environmental Technology Transfer, so that other
nations can benefit and contribute to this undertaking.
96 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, "Environment Data," 1987.
97 Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, 1987, p. 10.
98 Christopher Anderson, "A Huge Increase For Global Environment," Nature, January, 1991,
p.95. These R&D expenditures are not to be confused with the R&D budget of Japan's
Environment Agency. The noted expenditures are projects of MITI, a separate agency from the
Environment Agency.
99 Anderson, p.95.
100 Anderson, p.94.

RITE is modeled after the government-industry consortia that made
Japan world competitive in semiconductors and computers. It is currently
targeting seven fields, and each project has up to 16 companies participating.
Many other Japanese ministries, such as the Construction Ministry and the
Agriculture Ministry are joining in the venture and starting their own
environmental programs. This substantial support for technical assistance and
research programs is meant to encourage industries to reduce their produced
waste and to identify new processes to control pollution. By comparison, the
U.S. government spends relatively little money on waste reduction or research
efforts. For example, in 1988 the EPA's budget request for activities to minimize
waste was only .03 percent of its operating budget.101 (See Fig. 2.9).

Fig. 2.9 Government Subsidies for Environmental Research and
Development, In Millions of U.S. Dollars (At 1980 Price Level) And As A
Percentage of Total Research and Development Expenditures.
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Clearly, the Japanese are reaching both environmental and economic
goals while continuing to put a great deal of money into further research to help
solve environmental problems. If Japanese companies are as successful at
creating environmental technology as they have been in so many other
consumer and industrial markets, the United States may face the real possibility
that environmental competitiveness will ultimately exacerbate trade tensions.
American policy makers would then be placed in the awkward political position
of trying to discourage the domestic sale of environmentally sounder products
101 Adams et. al., p.343.
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even as they champion the virtues of clean air and environmental protection.
In summary, although Japan and the U.S. share similar formal political
structures, and have implemented almost identical pollution policies, Japan's
regulations, specifically air pollution regulations, have been implemented more
successfully. This success in achieving industrial compliance is primarily due to
the bureaucracy's ability to control the formulation of pollution laws and
cooperate with industry in their implementation. Importantly, the relationship
between business and government in Japan is not adversarial, rather it involves
many avenues of formal and informal cooperation. Additionally, the Japanese
government offers many research and financial incentives to industries in order
to reinforce a strong working relationship between the public and private
sectors in their efforts towards environmental clean up.

CHAPTER III

INDUSTRY AND AIR POLLUTION:
A Case Study of the Automobile Industry in the United States and
Japan

Fig. 3.0
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(g/km)

Japan (1976)
Japan (1978)
U.S.A.(1975)
U.S.A.(California 1975)
Canada (1975)
Sweden(1976)

CO

HC

NOx

2.10
2.10
9.30
5.60
15.62
24.20

0.25
0.25
0.93
0.56
1.25
2.10

0.60
0.25
1.93
1.25
1.94
1.90

CO=Carbon Monoxide / HC=Hydrocarbons / NOx=Nitrogen Oxides
'Source: OECD Environmental Policies in Japan, Paris 1977

It has previously been suggested that several factors are responsible for
Japan’s success with pollution controls and regulatory compliance. The
absence of these sam e factors can also explain the United States’
comparatively anemic efforts and accomplishments with this same goal. In brief
these factors include 1) Japan’s strong business - bureaucracy coalition as
opposed to a powerful U.S. private sector constantly resisting administrative
regulations 2) Financial aid and incentives given to Japanese industry to
induce both research and compliance compared to a lack of little or no financial
or research assistance in the U.S. 3) A pluralistic U.S. political system that
serves to debate and dilute substantial pieces of legislation, thus destroying the
initial purpose of legislation, as opposed to Japan’s relatively closed political
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system. These points can be effectively illustrated in a case study of industrial
compliance following the enactment of the Clean Air Acts in both Japan and the
United States.
Kelley, et al. state that, “The hallmark of contemporary American industry
is bigness.”102 As of 1976 half of all manufacturing assets were held by the
hundred largest companies in Am erica.103 According to the U.S. Department of
Com merce, although smaller companies have made substantial gains and
have softened this statistic, this figure remains fairly accurate.104 Most of these
large industries (automobile, steel, paper, petrochemical, oil, and power) are
oligopolistic. The most powerful firms in these areas adopt very cohesive
positions on environmental policy. Kelley et al. state of these firms,

Concealed behind a public-relations smoke screen of exhortations
about the need to balance environmental protection with continued
industrial growth, they consistently resist the enactment and
enforcement of legislation designed to promote environmental
policy.105

U.S. firms believe that it is in their best interest to resist any government controls
which would increase their production costs. Some industries are, of course,
more adversely affected by control efforts than others. These include such
industries as automobile manufacturers, oil companies, and electric power
utilities. This combination of resistance by the relatively few, but politically and
economically powerful, industries serves to adversely affect U.S. environmental
policy through strong anti-control lobbies at all levels of governm ent.106

102 Donald Kelley, Kenneth Stunkel, Richard Wescott, The Economic Superpowers and The
Environment: The United States. The Soviet Union, and Japan. (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman
and Company, 1976) p.29.
103 Kelley et. al., p.29.
104 Howard Schreier, The United States Department of Commerce, July 20,1993.
105 Kelley et. al., p.30.
106 pau| Downing, Air Pollution And The Social Sciences. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971)
p.5.
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Once again we will examine the Clean Air Act of 1970 to study U.S.
industry’s reaction to environmental legislation. The 1970 Clean Air Act was the
strongest piece of legislation aimed at restoring and maintaining the quality of
the environment yet passed in the United States. It was designed to give the
nation a clean and healthy atmosphere by the mid 1970’s. However,
considerable opposition from the private sector, in conjunction with the energy
and economic crisis, resulted in a great deal of relaxation in this goal. An
example of this effort to resist and reduce regulations can be provided by the
automobile industry.
The 1970 Clean Air Act gave many new powers to the Environmental
Protection Agency in a variety of areas affecting air pollution. With regard to
auto emissions, the law required a 90 percent reduction in emissions from the
levels produced by 1970 models of automobiles. These reductions were to be
achieved by January 1, 1975 for unburned hydrocarbons and carbon
monoxide, and by January 1, 1976 for nitrogen oxides. These standards could
be deferred for one year beyond the 1975 and 1976 target dates upon
application by individual manufacturers. The deferment was dependent upon
whether the EPA Administrator determined after a hearing, that 1) meeting the
standards by the dates set was not technologically feasible, and 2) that the
company in question had m ade a “good faith” effort to meet the standards
stipulated by the law .107
In 1970, the American automobile manufacturers were denounced as
one of the nation’s largest contributors to air pollution, accounting for about one
third of all health imperiling chemicals released into the air in the 1970’s.108

In

many cities pollution levels were several times higher than federal health

107 “The Question of Relaxing Automobile Emission Controls,” The Congressional Digest, March
1974, p.73.
108 uc ar Trouble,” The New Republic, August 11,1973.
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standards recommended. Additionally, the EPA had found that one quarter of
the children in cities had unacceptable lead levels in their bodies from
breathing air contaminated with lead from exhaust.109 There was no doubt that
the need for a substantial decline in automobile engine pollutants was a
necessity. However, the emission standards in the Clean Air Act of 1970 met
much opposition from the American automobile industry, an industry whose
m anagers had traditionally exercised a great deal of autonomy concerning the
external environment.
The United States automobile industry so vehemently attempted to
abolish the Clean Air Act’s regulations that it initiated one of the most intense
lobbying efforts of its time. Both Edward Cole, President of General Motors, and
Lee lacocca, Executive Vice President of Ford, personally took their case to
Washington, lacocca, who called a meeting of key Ford suppliers and dealers
to mount a large telegram campaign, went so far as to claim that the bill, “could
prevent continued production of automobiles after Jan. 1 , 1975.”110

Lobbyists

for the automobile industry met with Caspar Weinberger, Deputy Director of the
Office of M anagem ent and Budget, in an attempt to garner support for
interventions against the 1975 deadline. According to the automobile
companies these regulations were considered a total infringement upon freemarket objectives and a continual disruption in the functioning of their
com panies.111
The automobile industries stated that the Clean Air Act stipulations
exceeded their technological capabilities, and that attainment of the vehicle
emission standards for carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons by 1975, and for

109 The United States Environmental Protection Agency, “National Air Quality and Emissions
Trends Report,” 1991, p. 1-3.
110 “Detroit's Battle with Washington,” Business Week, December 5, 1970.
111 Robert Shook, Turnaround: The Ford Motor Company. (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1990)
p.6.
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oxides of nitrogen by 1976, was impossible.112 The resistance by the auto
companies took various forms, from lobbying Congress in order to delay the
implementation of standards, to igniting media campaigns, to simply refusing to
meet emissions standards and mandates on tim e.113 Conversely, many
scientists as well as politicians and environmentalists were convinced that the
automobile industry could, and should be expected to, comply with the
standards of the Clean Air Act. Senator Muskie claimed that Detroit already
possessed the laboratory technology to meet the 1975 standards.
The earliest filing date for complaints about the deadline was January 1,
1972. General Motors, then the richest company in America, was the first to
approach the EPA on January 12. Shortly following General Motor’s initiative,
Ford and Chrysler m ade separate appeals. Together the automobile
companies showered the EPA with more than 2,0 00 pages of evidence
claiming that despite its best efforts, the industry would not be able to meet the
deadline dates. In April 1972, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency held a hearing on the 1975 emission control standards required by the
Clean Air Act. This time the “Big Three of Detroit” (General Motors, Chrysler,
and Ford) insisted on at least a one year postponement of the implementation of
the standards. Testifying before officials of the EPA in Washington, executives
of General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors stated that their
vehicles could not meet the strict and “unrealistic” standards for exhaust
emissions.
Under the 1970 Clean Air Act, EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus could
grant an extension only if the industry demonstrated that the required
technology did not exist, despite a “good faith” effort to comply. According to
112 Elsom, p.171.
113 Dennis Patrick Quinn, Restructuring the Automobile Industry: A Study of Firms and States in
Modern Capitalism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) p.96.
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Ruckelshaus the automobile industry simply did not meet this requirement.
Ruckelshaus stated that, “They have not established that the technology does
not exist. The auto industry has neither built adequate test facilities nor
provided adequate financial support or cooperated with independent
suppliers.”114

Significantly, the fact that two Japanese auto companies had

already begun manufacturing cars that met the 1975 U.S. standards helped
persuade Ruckelshaus to veto the request for an extension. However, the auto
makers appealed the EPA's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals in
Washington. The Court found in February 1973 that economic considerations
had to be taken into account despite claims to the contrary by the EPA’s
Administrator William Ruckelshaus.115 Thus, in April 1973, the Environmental
Protection Agency was forced to succumb to the pressures of the automobile
industry and granted a one year extension for many emission standards.116
W hile Ruckelshaus eventually granted this extension, he did establish
two sets of interim standards for 1975, one for cars sold in California and the
other for cars sold elsewhere (S ee Fig. 3.0). These national interim standards
were still strict enough that the auto makers were forced to use catalysts in
California models. Chrysler Corporation, behind GM and Ford in research and
technology, had the biggest problem with these new standards. Chrysler
opposed the use of catalysts even in California, stating that it could not comply.
Ruckelshaus, however, expressed doubts as to whether Chrysler had made a
“good faith” effort to m eet the original standards. Engelhard Industries had
testified at the EPA hearings that Chrysler had refused to buy its catalysts
because Engelhard had supported the original Clean Air Acts standards.117
Chrysler denied this charge.
114 “Detroit failed to sway the EPA,” Business Week, May 20,1972.
115 Buchholz et. al., p.83.
116 Elsom, p. 171.
117 Elsom, p. 171.
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Upon achieving this one year extension the US automobile companies
had a double strategy. They wanted the extra year to continue working out the
problems with catalysts and to propose interim emission levels for 1975 that
would not need catalysts. More importantly, they tightened their campaign to
get Congress to relax or repeal the Clean Air Acts standards altogether. In fact,
Chrysler cam e up with a whole media campaign stating just this intent. They
argued that the strict regulations were not necessary for public health and
would raise car prices substantially. Executives from the automobile companies
continually lobbied senators and representatives, attempting to get
amendments to the Clean Air Act introduced by members of both political
parties.

Resistance by the U.S. Automobile Company
Considering them a detrimental infringement, The Ford Motor Company
was very much opposed to the politically imposed emission standards, and thus
was one of the largest lobbying forces behind the automobile industry’s attempt
to continually postpone attainment dates. Ford vigorously lobbied all levels of
government, and avidly stated its position at a series of Washington hearings,
as well as to individual politicians and to the public. Ford’s Chairman, Henry
Ford II sadly declared that, “They (the government) took the fun out of the
business.”118 Helen Petrauskas, Ford’s current Vice President of Environmental
and Safety Engineering explains, “Ford was asked to meet certain requirements
piecemeal - do this by this date, so much by this year, and then do this, and so
on, meaning that every year, we had to regroup and come up with more
changes.”119 The Clean Air Act Regulations were not only seen as an
infringement upon free market objectives, but were also considered a continual
118 Shook, p.7.
119 Shook, p.6.
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disruption in the functioning of the company.
General Motors, along with the other U.S. auto manufacturers, were well
known for resisting industrial policies. General Motors, one of the worlds
biggest manufacturing companies, already had a history of discrepancies in the
areas of both automobile safety and pollution. Ralph Nader’s 1960 protests on
the design and safety record of the Corvair forced G M to discontinue the Corvair
model. In California in 1966, G M ’s spokesmen protested against proposed
legislation establishing tougher standards for auto exhausts. It would be
impossible for GM to comply, they claimed. However, once the legislation had
been passed, it turned out not to be impossible for GM to meet the new
California standards. In 1969 the auto industry’s conspiracy to evade
technological revisions was exposed when the Justice Department filed an
antitrust suit against the domestic manufacturers and their trade association, the
Automobile Manufacturers Association. It was found that the AMA and four
automobile corporations had been conspiring to restrain the development and
marketing of auto exhaust control systems since 1 9 53.120 The evidence
brought together by a Los Angeles grand jury outlined the cross-licensing
agreem ent and other close associations between these so called “auto
competitors” that forged this illegal, “united front of inaction.”121

In September

1969 the domestic auto companies entered into a consentual agreement with
the government agreeing never to engage in such a conspiracy again. Yet, in
the 19 70’s they again united in a full blown effort to evade the Clean Air Act’s
emission standards.
Following the Clean Air Act of 1970 General Motors again vehemently
protested the new national standards. G M 's Chairman, Jam es Roche publicly
denounced the Clean Air Act, referring to it as, “A crusade for radical changes
120 Shook, p. 13.
121 Shook, p. 13.
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in our system of corporate, ownership- -changes so radical that they would all
but destroy free enterprise as we know it.”122 Although Ford and GM genuinely
believed that they were being asked to do more than their share for the
environment, one shouldn’t overlook the fact that in the last quarter of 1972 they
turned the greatest profits that they had yet recorded, netting 252 million dollars
and 651 million dollars respectively.123
Ralph Nader, a consumer activist who protested against safety
discrepancies in the auto industry in the 1960's, entered the arena to confront
the auto industry’s resistance to emission standards. Nader stated,

W hat the giant auto corporations say they cannot accomplish in 1975,
two small Japanese auto companies have already accomplished.
According to official US Environmental Protection Agency test results,
Honda and Toyo Kogyo have easily met the 1975 standards for
50,000 miles with their respective vehicles. In these durability tests
the Japanese vehicles performed well under the levels of emissions
permitted for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and oxides of
nitrogen.124

Nader also pointed out that the National Academy of Sciences, in a report
prepared for Congress under the Clean Air Act, concluded that the US auto
industry would be able to meet the 1975 standards with four types of systems.
These systems included 1) a modified conventional engine equipped with an
oxidation catalyst, 2) carbureted stratified charge engine (like Honda), 3) a
W ankel engine equipped with a thermal reactor (M azda), and 4) the diesel
engine. Contrary to the US industries claims, the NAS found that the domestic
manufacturers could m eet the 1975 standards with modified conventional
engines equipped with an oxidation catalyst.125

122 Shook, p.6.
123 “Car Trouble,” The New Republic, August 11, 1973.
124 Ralph Nader, “I Think I Can’t...” The New Republic, March 10,1973, p. 13.
125 Nader, Hl Think I Cant," p.13.
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The Automobile Industry’s Success
The First Session of the 93rd Congress saw the introduction of a number
of bills directed specifically at the question of modifying emission standards.
Additionally, several committees such as the Senate Committee on Public
Works, the Senate Committee on Air and W ater Pollution, and The House
Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment, held hearings concerning
this issue. In Decem ber 1973, the House opened floor debate on the proposed
National Energy Emergency Act, which included emission control modifications
to the Clean Air Act. In June, 1974 Congress passed the Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act, which extended the emissions deadline for yet
another year.126 Shortly following this extension, the Ford Motor Company
asked for a third one year extension of the auto emission deadlines.127
In March of 1975 the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment began hearings on issues related to amending the 1970 Clean Air
Act.

After more pressure from the automobile industry, and claims that the

regulations were too difficult to reach and were affecting production, the EPA
suspended the emission standards until 1977 and 1978, to allow vehicle
manufacturers to devote more time to improving fuel economy. However, the
automobile industry claimed that vehicle emission requirements were adversely
affecting the automobile industry and would give foreign producers an
advantage over the U.S. automobile industry. These economic and
technological arguments gained increasing public, media and government
attention as the energy crisis emerged and was followed by an economic
recession.
In what becam e an enduring campaign for the automobile industry, the
big three auto manufacturers again asked Congress to delay the emission
126 Nader, "I Think I Cant," p.13.
127 Buchholz et. alMp.84.
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standards scheduled for the 1977 and 1978 model cars. The standards cannot
be met, they once again claimed, without a drop in fuel mileage and increases
in car prices. Chrysler stated that 1977 standards would raise new car prices by
260 dollars.

All of the auto companies said that the 1978 standard for nitrogen

oxides could not be met. In contrast, two Japanese made cars, Honda and the
W ankel powered M azda, had already met the 1975 standards by 1973, without
using catalysts (the controversial engine that the US auto makers were using to
cut emissions). Honda also easily met the 1976 nitrogen oxides standard.
Richard Ayers of the Natural Resources Defense Council stated, “That engine
(Hondas) destroys Detroit’s case. W hat can they say when a relatively midget
company does what the giants cant.”128
Still, the U.S. automobile companies continued making cars under 1977
standards because they thought that Congress was going to grant them an
extension. Both Houses of Congress had indicated that this was their intent.
The Senate had passed a bill extending 1977 standards one year. The House
of Representatives adopted an amendment offered by John Dingell, a Democrat
from Michigan who served a constituency largely dependent on the automobile
industry. Dingell’s amendment would have given the industry five years to
gradually meet the revised final emission standards.129

However, Utah

Senator Jake G am , a Republican from Utah, filibustered against the
compromised version of the bill. Ironically Senator Garn sympathized with the
auto industry in terms of granting them more lenient standards. However, Garn
was angry about a totally separate provision of the bill, that had nothing to do
with the automobile industry.
Senator Garn contested a separate provision that said Utah and other
---------------------------------------------i
128 "Emission Controls: What Detroit Wants From Washington,” Business Week, March 31,1972,
p .15.
129 “Detroit and Congress,” Forbes, Feb. 15, 1977, p.33.
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unpolluted states could not pollute up to the national limits; they must keep their
air clean, with no significant deterioration. To Garn and his constituents this
seem ed to be a ban on any further industrialization. So Garn filibustered
against the whole bill, killing it for that session of Congress. In doing so he
destroyed the limited reprieve Congress was prepared to give the automobile
industry.
However, the automobile industries' case was reinforced with the energy
crisis (the oil embargo of 1973), rising unemployment, and continual claims that
stringent vehicle emission requirements were adversely affecting the
%

automobile industry and would give foreign producers an advantage over the
U.S. automobile industry. These factors served to slowly ease the political and
public weight on the auto industry to m eet emission standards. Eventually
Clean Air Act Amendments were passed in August 1977. These amendments
postponed the original 1975-6 carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon standards
until 1981, and relaxed the standard for oxides of nitrogen to take effect later
than 1981, not specified.130 Many of the initial 1970 standards were never met
as the legislation was debated, lobbied and eventually diluted. It is important to
understand that this lobbying to continually avoid and push back emission
standards was and is not endemic to the automobile industry. Several other
industries have succeeded in other emission postponements as well (DuPont
recently lobbied aggressively for many of the 1990 amendments to the Clean
Air Act).
This case study illustrates that environmental policy making in the United
States is marked by intense industrial lobbies, and takes place against a
platform of decentralization in both policy-making and administrative functions.
As is illustrated by the auto industry's continual lobbying efforts in Congress, the

130 Elsom, p. 171.
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Executive Branch, the EPA, and the public arena, the U.S. political system is
extraordinarily open, or pluralistic, in the sense that competing interests can
organize and lobby all levels of government with few restrictions.

In

conjunction with this pluralistic environment is the assumption that all sides will
have their say in some appropriate forum. However, as environmental lobbies
have typically lacked the financial resources of business, and thus the ensuing
political power of business that follows from financial resources, environmental
regulations often express the interests of industry in the United States.
Industrial and business groups have distinct advantages in their struggle
with environmental lobbies. They are very knowledgeable about the formal as
well as the informal rules by which the political system operates. Many
business lobbyists are highly paid lawyers or experts in technical fields; hence
they can participate directly or indirectly in the legislative process by suggesting
policies or by providing industry sponsored data or commentary on proposed
environmental legislation.131

Additionally, campaign contributions are an

effective tool for the private sector, with the implied threat of political sanctions
and loss of further funds to a candidate for failure to resist regulations. Private
Sector lobbyists may also generate a deluge of letters or organize other public
opinion measures to support their pro-growth, anti-regulation efforts.
Although environmentalists can use similar tactics, the business lobbyists
are better equipped with funds, as most environmental organizations are
dependent on voluntary contributions which are not tax deductible.
Furthermore, environmental groups with tax exempt status are legally forbidden
to lobby, whereas business firms can write off as business expenses many
costs associated with their lobbying.132 These factors have all served to give
strength to industry’s effort to oppose and limit environmental regulations in the
131 Kelley et. al., p. 153.
132 Kelley et. al., p.153.
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United States. In the United States the decade of th e l 9 7 0 ’s was referred to as
the “environmental decade” as a result of the large body of environmental
legislation enacted by Congress during that time. But the implementation of the
legislation is still occurring well into the 1990’s; not only Clean Air legislation,
but Clean W ater, Superfund, and many other pieces of environmental
legislation.

Japan’s Automobile Industry And The Clean Air Act
As previously established, due to the fact that Japan was a late
developing nation and needed centralized political and financial controls to
develop economically, policy making in Japan takes place through an elaborate
process of consensus making dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (until
recently), government bureaucracies, and industry. This approach minimizes
political conflict, and results in a tightly restricted decision making system in
which the majority of policy proposals come from the bureaucracies
them selves.133 Additionally, the LDP and M ITI have provided industry with tax
breaks and tariff shields in order to entice them to reach emission goals.
Furthermore, both the Japanese government and business place a great deal of
importance on innovation and new technology. Subsequently, both the public
and private sectors invest a great deal of money into research and
development. In 1971, research on electronics, motor vehicle safety, and
pollution control, received top priority for research and development in
Japan .134
Detroit auto makers did indeed spend millions of dollars attempting to
improve automobile emissions. However, the U.S. government told its

133 Kelley et. al., p.186.
134 C.S. Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry and the U.S. Market. (New York. Praeger
Publishers, 1981) p.57.
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automobile companies to reach the sam e standards as Japanese industry, yet
offered little financial or research assistance to achieve this goal.

Perhaps this

is why most automobile innovations have been the work of foreign automobile
companies. With the exception of the turbine, all of the more promising
alternative automobile engines have been developed in Europe and Japan.
The only long standing government automotive research and
development effort in the U.S. has been that of the Army Tank Automotive
Com m and.135 The primary government responsibility for civilian automotive
research and development in the 1970’s was placed in the Energy Research
and Development Administration (E R D A ).136 The funding for Alternative
automotive engines program was about three tenths of one percent of ERDA’s
energy research and development budget. This was 5.6 million in fiscal 1971
and 7.2 million in 19 75.137 Research funding and tax incentives for industry in
the United States is quite a different situation from that of Japan.
In September 1971, the responsibility of setting Japan’s auto emission
standards was transferred from the Ministry of Transportation to the newly
created Environment Agency. Japan’s automobile induced air pollution was as
bad if not worse than U.S. levels. In 1970 and 1971 photochemical smog was
so abundant in Japanese cities that it was becoming a significant health hazard.
By 1972 Japan’s new Environment Agency had laid out recommendations for
auto emission standards to be met in Japan by 1975 and 1976. Japan decided
to adopt the same emission standards as the U.S. Clean Air Act standards
(some of Japan's were actually more stringent). Because the U.S. was a major
market for Japanese automobiles, Japan reasoned that it would have to meet
U.S. standards anyway.

135 Arnold Reitze, “Stalled,” Environment, Aug., 1977, p.41.
136 Reitze, p.41.
137 Reitze, p.41.
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However, by 1973 the U.S. EPA had extended its enforcement
deadlines. Consequently, Japanese automobile companies argued that it was
not immediately necessary to meet the U.S. standards. Because of this
opposition the Environment Agency requested that a Central Council
reconsider the 1976 NOx standards, much as the U.S. had. The Central
Council initiated an Expert Advisory Committee on Automotive Production and
set out to reexamine the issue.138 After a great deal of investigation the Central
Council maintained that the auto industry possessed the technology to meet the
1976 NOx standard, but did require more time to mass produce these new
engines.139
With the conclusion of the controversy over the 1976 deadline The
Environment Agency established plans for obtaining compliance by the new
1978 deadline. During this time the Air Pollution Bureau assembled a study
group on NOx emission control in order to bypass any future complications.
The NO x study group gathered data on new technological developments that
could improve emission standards, and researched the issues that were certain
to be debated in the future regarding the capability of reaching NOx emission
regulations. The NOx study group worked with automobile industry executives
and independent research technicians to investigate all problems that could
arise with industry compliance.

The Japanese Automobile Company
In 1973, the whole nature of the issue changed. Previously, in February
1971, Honda Motor had announced the development of its new Compound
Vortex Controlled Combustion (C VC C ) engine system. This system was created
in order to meet automobile exhaust emission control regulations for both Japan
138 Fujikura et. al., p. 270.
139 Fujikura et. al., p. 142.
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and the United States. In 1973, around the same time that the United States
decided to postpone the initial standards of the Clean Air Act, Honda Motor’s
cars with C V C C engines were introduced to the public. Honda's introduction of
the C V C C engine made the formerly minor auto maker one of the major players
in the U.S. market. In 1973 the National Academy of Sciences in the United
States gave top marks to Honda’s C VC C engine, which it said was the world’s
first to meet the 1975 standards set forth by the U.S. Clean Air Act.140 In tests
held in Michigan, Honda’s four cylinder engines, using no catalysts, achieved
pollution counts well below EPA standards even after running for 50,00 0 miles.
Honda executives announced that they would no longer seek any
postponements in emission requirements, and that their new car, the Civic,
would go on sale in the U.S. by 1 9 74.141
In May 1973, a hearing was held on the Japanese 1975 emission control
standards. W hile many of the Japanese manufacturers did favor a
postponement, Honda Motor and Toyo Kogyo stated unequivocally that they
could meet the standards on tim e.142 Many of the other auto companies
announced that with tax incentives and research funding they too could meet
the 1978 standards. In August, 1976, five of the nine Japanese automobile
companies announced at a hearing held by the study group that they would
meet the NOx standard in 1 9 78.143 The NOx study group immediately
concluded its report and announced to the Environment Agency that all
emission standards could and would be met by 1978. Subsequently, all of the
Japanese automobile manufacturers were able to meet Japan’s 1978 emission
standards which called for a 90 percent reduction in most emissions.144
140 Tetsuo Sakiya, Honda Motor: The Men. The Management and the Machines. (Tokyo:
Knoansh International, 1982) p. 182.
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Eiji Toyoda recounts the process of reaching emission standards at
Toyota during the early 197 0’s. Eiji states,

Naturally, we knew that there w as little solid evidence to support the case
for tighter regulations. The only answer the Environment Agency could
give us was: ‘It’s better to have clean air than dirty air.’ But implementing
auto emissions controls will raise the price of cars, we insisted. ‘Money is
of no concern when it comes to people’s health, they replied.’ There was
nothing we could say to that.145

The challenge was in both maintaining Toyota’s existing performance levels
and meeting the standards. Toyota worked with M ITI, the Environment Agency,
and eventually Honda, to reach emission standards. Eiji Toyoda stated that
initially the company saw little hope of meeting the final target by the specified
date:

W e had the whole company working on the problem, but when we
learned of the merits of the low emissions C VC C engine developed by
Honda, we swallowed our pride and asked them for the technology.
These efforts were applauded by the Environment Agency.146

Toyota eventually reached all of the emission standards set by the Environment
Agency due to the combined efforts of business, government, and inter
business relations.

Compliance by Japan’s Automobile Industry
W hat is remarkable is that while the biggest automobile company in the
world, General Motors, was still at the design stage, two small Japanese
companies had already designed engines that passed emission tests in U.S.
and Japanese factories and had put these new engines into the marketplace
(H onda’s Civic and Toyo Kogyo’s M azda). The success of the Japanese
145 Eiji Toyoda, Tovota: Fifty Years in Motion. (New York: Kodansha International, 1985) p.140.
146 Toyoda, p. 142.
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automobile industry in meeting stringent standards can be attributed to a variety
of factors. Primary among these factors were the Japanese government's many
efforts to work with the automobile industry on achieving emission standards.
Unlike the United States, when the Japanese government and Environment
Agency announced their stringent regulations they also attempted to achieve
compliance by offering recommendations and advice concerning technical and
economic difficulties. An additional motivation was the generous tax incentives
and research funding that were offered in order to reward companies that
produced low pollution cars, and penalized companies that did not.
Environment Agency officials also relied on the Study Group on NOx Emission
Control to bring technical problems of compliance into an arena that allowed
government and industry to work together to acquire more knowledge regarding
emission capabilities, and to discuss present technological problems regarding
compliance issues.
The effectiveness of administrative guidance, as well as research and
financial aid from the government, help explain why Japanese automobile
companies did not challenge the implementation of the Environment Agency’s
regulation through extensive litigation as the U.S. auto industries did.147 This
guidance by Japan’s administrative agencies also provides an explanation as
to why Japan was able to reach their designated emission standards while the
United States automobile industries were not. In sum, the close relationship
between the bureaucracy and industry in Japan has served to achieve
environmental ideals as easily as they have also served economic growth. In
fact, they have currently achieved one without sacrificing the other.

147 Fujikura et. al., p. 273.
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P O L IC Y

The United States political system was designed to represent a variety of
interests. The Founding Fathers wanted a government that was responsive to
the people. They also wanted a government of balanced and limited powers.
Thus, from the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 until the present day, the
principle of separation of powers has existed at the core of the American
Constitutional order. Although powers are not separated in a pure sense, the
three branches of government do encompass distinctly different responsibilities
and practices. It has often been suggested that the separation of powers makes
it extremely difficult for American institutions to generate the political leadership
necessary to make strong coherent policy, and instead often inhibits action and
coordination in government. Jam es McGregor Burns argues that,

The fear of arbitrary power and majority tyranny so dominated the
minds of the framers that they devised a political system that made any
kind of effective political action extremely difficult, if not im possible.. . to
a large extent our system was designed for deadlock and inaction.148

Added to this system is a market-based economy in which information
and competition is allocated through independent players in an economic
market that is dislocated from the political system. In this arena there is a lack of
centralized power and a great deal of fragmentation. Private groups,

148 Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey Tullis, "The Constitution, Politics and the Presidency," in
Joseph M.Bessette and Jeffrey Tulles, eds., The Presidency In The Constitutional Order.
(Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1981) p.5.
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specifically well organized and wealthy groups, have many advantages in this
system. Interest groups can penetrate the political decision making process at
virtually all levels. Administrative agencies are open to direct infiltration by
groups concerned with specific agency decisions. Political representatives are
also susceptible to groups with financial resources and political power. Finally,
in this plural system the media is a powerful tool to those who have the
resources to use it. As noted earlier, all of these factors contributed to the
success of the U.S. automobile lobby in defeating environmental regulations.
Thus, the plurality of the separated U.S. political system infringes upon the
implementation of its environmental regulations.
This is not to say that U.S. decision makers are hapless victims of
societal pressure groups. They are not. U.S. leaders have been able to
formulate clear policy objectives. In international monetary issues, they have
had a relatively free hand because of the arenas in which decisions have been
m ade.149 However, the structural characteristics of the American polity allow
domestic groups to impose more constraints on the state than in most other
advanced countries.

Political Economies and Environmental Policy
In the pluralistic political system of the U.S., the economic system further
aggravates the already fragmented system. W hen analyzing comparative
environmental policy, the central factor to examine is how, and to what extent,
the national government goes about interacting or intervening with private
sector practices. M ax W eber made the distinction between a “market economy”
and a “planned economy.” A market economy is a political economy in which

149 On the importance of decision-making arenas see E.E. Schattschneider, The SemiSovereion Peopie: A Realist's View of Democracy in America. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1960).
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the private sector makes independent economic decisions and the central
government allows or encourages the private sector to act independently. Put
simply, in a market-based system such as that of the U.S., the government is
essentially removed from the economic market. Thus, U.S. leaders have
relatively few policy instruments for intervening in the economy. In a planned
economy, which Japan maintains many elements of, the government decides
the overall direction of the economy; it influences the economy by directing its
funding to specific industries or markets. Certainly all states intervene in the
economy to a certain extent, the question is to what degree.
Chalmers Johnson labels modern Japan as “plan rational”, and defines
the United States as “market rational.” Johnson states,

A market rational state concerns itself with the forms and procedures of
economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive
matters. The plan rational state, by contrast, has as its dominant feature
precisely the setting of such substantive social and economic goals.150

Furthermore, Johnson states that the most important evaluative standard in a
market rational society is efficiency, as compared to effectiveness taking
precedence in a plan rational system. Consequently, plan rational systems are
capable of greater effectiveness than the market rational system in handling
industrial policy, and specifically pollution regulation. The fact that Japan has
many characteristics of a planned or plan rational economy, has allowed it to
achieve more success in pollution control than the United States.
The American combination of an intensely decentralized system with a
market-oriented democracy has often resulted in policies that have been so
debated and compromised that their original intent is diluted and often rendered
ineffective. To simply acquire information from the private sector, much less
150 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy. 19251975. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,1982) p. 19.
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force private producers to modify their processes, the U.S. government must
intrude in a way that runs counter to strong traditions of private property and a
market economy in the U.S., where business and industry is not under the
purview of government. In the U.S. the private sector is an independent entity
with one goal - to increase profits. However, as the United States is also a very
pluralistic society which includes many interest groups, the desires of both the
executive and legislative branches must contend with the desires of
environmental pressure groups and other special interest groups to regulate
industry’s actions regarding the environment. Thus, industry and
environmentalists ally themselves with various government authorities or
agencies to battle over regulatory standards. The constant conflict between free
market philosophy and environmental regulation serves to compromise the
policy-making process, resulting in a weakly implemented environmental policy
and the highest rate of appeals, postponement and litigation in the world where
environmental regulation is concerned.151 The effects of successfully lobbying
against initial legislation were illustrated during the U.S. auto industry’s
campaign against The Clean Air Act's regulations.

Administrative Agencies and Environmental Policy
In the U.S. system, the private sector maintains a great deal of autonomy,
and the public sector consists of separated branches with separated powers. In
this fragmented system the bureaucracy has limited influence, and thus limited
ability to implement its goals. W hen comparing separate approaches to
environmental policy in the U.S. and Japan, it is important to realize that
Japan's bureaucracy has traditionally dominated the legislative process in
Japan, due to its central role in developing Japans economy following both the
151 Vogel, National Styles of Regulation, p.27.
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Meiji restoration and, more specifically, W W II. Japan's administrative agencies
maintain a great deal of economic and political power and Japan's private
sector continues to be guided by these strong bureaucratic agencies.
Furthermore, Japan’s administrative agencies attract the highest ranking
graduates of the best Universities in Japan, and the positions of top officials in
the Ministries have traditionally been the most prestigious in the Japanese
society.152 Chalmers Johnson states that, “the elite bureaucracy of Japan
makes most major decisions, drafts virtually all legislation, controls the national
budget, and is the source of all major policy innovations in the system.”153
Conversely, American policy decisions are principally made in Congress, which
also controls the budget. Furthermore, U.S. bureaucratic agencies tend to have
their own individual interests, thereby exacerbating the existing fragmentation of
power.
The success of Japan's pollution abatement policies can be largely
credited to the strength of both the Japanese business-government coalition, as
well as the strength of Japan’s administrative agencies. The bureaucracy’s
traditional monopoly over the legislative process, and the consequential lack of
success of opposition sponsored bills regarding environmental policy support
this thesis. The Japanese bureaucracy’s power is further reinforced by the fact
that it not only drafts legislation, but it is also the principal interpreter of
legislation.154
Conversely, in the United States, Congress basically interacts with the
administrative agency by saying, “here is the problem-deal with it.”155
Furthermore, the U.S. administrative agency, the EPA, does not have the
authority or the funds that it needs to coerce industry into achieving the set
152
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regulatory standards. This stands in stark contrast to M ITI and The Environment
Agency in Japan, both of which have considerably more means of promoting
industry's compliance for pollution standards than does the EPA. National
policy-making in Japan is almost entirely dominated by a strong and capable
bureaucracy interested in increasing technology and efficiency in the constant
pursuit of economic growth.

The Business Lobby in the United States
In the United States, there are no set goals or rules concerning
environmental policy making and its implementation. Those with large
resources, such as industry, have always been better represented by interest
groups, and the least wealthy have typically failed to organize.156
Consequently, the rise of interest groups and decline of political parties over the
past three decades has drastically aggravated the U.S. policy making process.
George Stiglers's “capture theory” of regulation assumes self interested
behavior by both politicians and their constituents. Under this view,
representatives and political parties seek electoral success as well as the
power and perks of political office. They do not act on behalf of their own views
or values concerning policy; they, in effect, sell political power to any group that
purchases policies with votes and resources. Therefore a group’s ability to offer
the requisite payment is the basis of an effective political dem and.157
Similar to the capture theory, the “Electoral Theory of Congress”,
developed by David Mayhew and Morris Fiorina, is based on the premise that
members of Congress seek only reelection. In regard to legislation, the theory
suggests, members of Congress earn electoral rewards mainly by servicing

156 Jeffrey Berry, The Interest Group Society. (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1984) p.3.
157 Paul Quirk, Bevond Self Interest. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. 184.
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organized interest groups and seeking benefits for their constituents. These
activities give benefits to groups that are capable of recognizing their
representatives effort, and rewarding them with some form of support.
Consequently, members of Congress gain little support by trying to advance
broad interests or to implement an ideology.158 In short, Congress has an
exceedingly limited capacity to serve the broad or diffuse interests of the nation
as a whole. Instead its main desire is to distribute particularized benefits to
specific localities and organized groups.159
Administrative agencies also have incentives to adopt certain policy
preferences. Some agencies have independent ties with particular business
sectors, interest groups and/or Congressional committees.160 These
independent forces generate intense activity aimed at influencing the
bureaucracy’s decisions and actions. According to Paul Quirk, one of the most
common and serious criticisms of administrative agencies is that which accuses
regulatory agencies, "of persistently serving the interests of regulated industries
to the neglect or harm of more general, or ’public,' interests."161 Such behavior
is variously referred to as "clientelism," "agency capture," or "producer (or
industry) protection."162 Regardless of the name, the accusation implies
excessive industry influence on regulatory agencies.163 As regulations often
have major effects on the interests and practices of regulated industries,
industry perceives that its overall financial position can be significantly affected
by regulatory agency decisions, in response it can generate intense activity
aimed at influencing them.
158 Quirk, Beyond Self Interest, p. 186.
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Aside from lobbying, and the financial advantage that industry maintains
in lobbying efforts, there are many ways that the private sector can generate
influence of a regulatory agency. In some cases the information on which
agency decisions are based is often obtained mainly from the regulated
industries themselves. This is sometimes due to the failure of non-industry
groups to participate in the policy making process, or from the fact that only
industry has the information needed for the decision.164 It is also suggested that
under certain political administrations industry can influence the bureaucratic
appointment process, in this case appointees tend to favor the interests of
industry.165 Additionally, regulated industries and firms may be able to reward
or punish regulatory agencies through their access to higher political
authorities. Another explanation for the "capture" of an agency by industry has
to do with the career patterns of regulatory officials; specifically those who
leave their agencies and go to work for regulated industries.166 Finally,
although Quirk questions its frequency, there remains the matter of corruption
and of practices that border on corruption. Bribes, legitimate business
opportunities, speaking engagements, trips, gifts, all may at times be offered to
regulatory officials with the intention of influencing them .167 As regulatory
legislation tends to permit the administering

agency some discretion, through

the use of vague statutory standards as "the publicinterest, or,as deemed
necessary," regulatory agencies are able to, and often do, protect industry
interests.
Clearly, the most vigorous opposition to environmental objectives in the
United States comes from the business community. In legislative,
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administrative, and judicial action, in the mass media, in public relations
campaigns, in scientific and technical claims and data, its resistance to
ecological concerns and environmental regulations is great. Each form of
business, be it raw material production, manufacturing, commerce,
transportation, or construction, has its own particular objection to environmental
proposals, and almost all business groups find common reasons to produce a
shared objection to pollution regulations.
W hile citizen movements have certainly played, and still do play, a role in
the structuring of environmental policies, they have seldom shaped
environmental policy directly.168 That shaping takes place largely through the
interaction of administrators and large well organized national interest groups
representing either environmental causes or industrial interests. In this process
the private sector typically proves to be the most influential. The U.S. Congress,
Executive branch, and the EPA are all strongly influenced by powerful business
lobbies that continually resist government regulations, such as air pollution
polices.

The Council On Competitiveness
The business lobby has not only had a great deal of control over the
actions of Congress and administrative agencies, but it increased its power vis
a vis Congress and the bureaucracy during the presidential administrations of
Presidents Reagan and Bush. The Task Force on Regulatory Relief was
created under Ronald R eagan’s presidency in an effort to cut federal
regulations of business. In a 1981 speech President Reagan stated, “American
Society experienced a virtual explosion in government regulation in the 19 70’s.
Excessive and inefficient regulations limit job opportunities, raise prices and

168 Buchholz et al., p.81.
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reduce the incomes of all Americans ”169

President Reagan proudly claimed

that after the first year of the task force’s operation his administration had, “acted
quickly and effectively to cut away the thicket of federal regulations... a thicket
that was stifling business and industrial growth.”170 The task force was
extremely effective in cutting the costs and effectiveness of EPA regulations.
In a concurring speech in 1981 Vice-President Bush similarly declared
that “we have regulated ourselves to death.”171

On March 31, 1989 President

Bush issued an executive order creating the Council On Competitiveness. The
Council served to review issues that dealt with the competitiveness of the U.S.
in the international market, including regulatory relief. The Council On
Competitiveness was headed by Vice President Quayle. Quayle’s actions and
intentions as head of The Council aroused a great deal of concern from the
Council’s critics, as Quayle’s preemptive power as head of The Council was so
strong that he was frequently able to overrule the heads of federal agencies
such as the EPA.
Representative Henry W axm an (Democrat-California), a principal author
of The Clean Air Act, charged that The Council was systematically attempting to
undermine the implementation of the Clean Air Act’s mandates. The
Competitiveness Council suggested more than a hundred changes to the Clean
Air Act of 1990. The most controversial was a proposed amendment that would
allow companies to set their own pollution levels.172 W axm an claimed that this
provision would basically negate the Clean Air Act by allowing a polluter to
increase emissions without limit if a state did not object within seven days.
Changes were also made by The Council on pollution permits, allowing

169 “The Regulators Ride Again,” The New York Times, April 28,1991, p.5.
170 "The Regulators Ride Again," p.5.
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industries to increase their emissions under the claim of “emergency
circumstances.” The Competitiveness Council could effectively get away with
many of its deregulatory attempts, as it maintained that it was part of the White
House and, consequently, its communications and actions were part of the
Executive decision making process and not subject to Congressional
oversight.173 Therefore, from 1981 (following the automobile industry’s last
compliance deadline) to 1992 the Regulatory Relief Task Force and the Council
on Competitiveness acted solely to minimize the effects of federal regulations
on the private sector. The Council successfully rewrote regulatory law, and
acted in opposition to Congress’s legislative mandate as well as the EPA’s
public mandate to pass and implement environmental legislation.

The Media and Environmental Policy
Interest group lobbying is also directed at influencing any government
institution or official indirectly by attempting to sway public opinion, with the
intent of influencing the action of an institution of official. Thus, the business
lobby in the U.S. goes beyond the political system to acquire public support as
well. In the public policy arena, the private sector has to promote free enterprise
and overshadow those forces that would serve to paint a negative picture of free
enterprise. In this new activism of business lobbies, advocacy-issue advertising
has become an effective public relations vehicle for business. Companies are
attempting to make themselves heard and seen in a positive light on a broad
range of social, economic, environmental, and other legislative issues.174
Sethi points out,

173 “Competitiveness Council Under Scrutiny” The Washington Post, November 26, 1991,
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This important communication tool will influence not only the activities
of its sponsors- -notably the private corporate sector- -but also the
nature of public policy debate. One has only to look at the onslaught of
political commercials during an election campaign to appreciate how
they have irrevocably changed the character of the electoral process,
and indeed the political process, in the United States.175

Over the past three decades there has been a tremendous increase in
the effectiveness and growth of advocacy advertising in the United States. In a
nationwide survey of public attitudes regarding this promotional advertising, 60
percent of the respondents endorsed the concept of corporate advocacy
advertising, even though 64 percent acknowledged that companies using such
advertising might have an unfair advantage over public interest groups, as they
would have less money to spend for such advertisements.176 5 7 percent of
those who said they had been aware of issue advertising reported that the ads
had caused them to change their minds about an issue.177 W hat they learned
from the ads prompted 84 percent of respondents to vote for or against a
candidate; 40 percent to attempt to change someone else’s mind about an
issue; and 25 percent to write to public officials.178
According to these percentages advocacy advertising is an effective tool
for business. Consequently, the private sector has used advocacy advertising
for a multitude of reasons; to clear a tarnished public image, to oppose
regulatory policy, to sell an idea, to support a political candidate sympathetic to
private sector interests, or to promote itself as environmentally responsible. As
noted in the automobile industry’s case study, Chrysler Corporation utilized the
power of advocacy advertising against the Clean Air Act in the 1970’s.
Although this tool is available to other groups as well, they typically do not have
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the funds or resources necessary to utilize the mass media as readily and
effectively as big business. This phenomena of advocacy advertising has
recently occurred in other countries, particularly Canada, Great Britain, and
Western Europe, but has not reached such a degree in Japan.179

Culture and Cooperation
It is clear at this point in the study that two different political approaches to
environmental policy exist within the U.S. and Japan. The political structures
themselves have partially evolved as a result of separate cultures and histories.
The plurality of the U.S and the strong bureaucratic system of Japan serve as
examples of such political traditions and cultures.
In Japan the implementation of government industrial policy is facilitated
by a credit-based industrial finance system, which allocates resources through
state influence and administrative policies.180 The central concern of the
Japanese state, specifically following W W II, has been economic development.
From the beginning of the post W W II era, the Japanese bureaucracy had a
strong commitment to moving labor out of low productivity sectors into high
wage industries, specifically moving labor out of agriculture and into industry.
The industrial structure built in Japan since 1945 has, to a large degree, been
due to the deliberate restructuring promoted by Japan’s bureaucratic agencies.
The bureaucracy channeled resources into those industries for which there was
a growing domestic demand and potential economic growth. Thus, policy for
industrial development in Japan was historically formulated within a triangle of
government bureaucrats, major companies, and banks. In this process the
centralized bureaucracy was, and remains, somewhat insulated from
179 T.J. Pempel, ed., Policy Making in Contemporary Japan. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1977) p.36.
180 Zysman, 234.
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parliamentary and public pressure and has "been manned by a mandarine elite
that stands first among equals."181
In combination with historical factors Japan’s eastern culture offers a very
different platform for industrial regulation when compared to the U.S.'s free and
open western society.182 Shuji Hayashi writes, "All behavior- -greetings, table
manners, sleeping habits; how people ride an escalator, run a meeting, or
reach a consensus- -is part of culture. These forms of behavior are transmitted
from generation to generation."183 In the Japanese culture there is a tradition of
submissiveness to authority, possibly making Japan a more fertile ground for
policy implementation and adherence. Additionally, in Japan, management
emphasizes completion of a task and attainment of objectives, where the
predominant pattern in all organizations is team work.184 Hayashi claims that
the Japanese feel very uncomfortable about leaving a task only ninety percent
com pleted.185
The U.S. does not have this similar historical or cultural backdrop to draw
from. As previously stated, the U.S. political system is relatively weak when
compared to other industrialized countries. The founding fathers specifically
intended to construct a system designed to restrain power. In addition, in this
relatively weak system of separated powers, private groups are able to
penetrate the political process quite easily, consequently effecting policy
making and policy outcomes. Furthermore, America's financial system is also
decentralized, leaving the government with few economic controls by which to
influence industry. Thus, due to cultural and historical reasons, Japan is better
able to achieve a strong and consistent environmental regulatory policy, while
181 Zysman, p.235.
182 Shuji Hayashi, Culture and Management in Japan. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988),
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the U.S. system and culture tends to encourage deliberation and deadlock at
the expense of action.

Summary
It is apparent that in some policy areas, governments distinguish
themselves from one another more by their policy implementation methods than
by their choice of policy content.186 As examined throughout this paper, over
the past twenty-five years the United States and Japan have adopted similar
environmental regulations, specifically air pollution standards as seen in this
study. The national governments of both the United States and Japan have set
comparable emission regulations for similar types of atmospheric pollutants.
However, when it comes to implementing this legislation, each government
approaches industry compliance by contrasting means. In the simplest sense,
what separates these approaches from one another is the balance they adopt
between enforcement through a concerted industry-government effort, as seen
in Japan, or enforcement in a fragmented arena consisting of conflicting views
and competing power forces, as in the United States.
The frequent confrontations occurring in this system are not only
confrontations between opposing sides, industry versus environmentalists, but
rather, confrontations pitting each of these groups against various governmental
authorities.187 Environmentalists constantly sue the regulatory agencies to
secure stricter environmental regulations, while business groups sue to relax
these regulations.188 The eventual results of these adversarial relationships
upon pollution policy has been lengthy litigation, lenient regulations with far
reaching schedules, and few punishments for noncompliance. Conversely, in
Japan regulatory policy is typically the product of an alliance between national
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government Ministries and business associations. Through this intricate
network between institutions, industry interests are incorporated into the policy
making process and, in turn, administrative agencies encourage businesses to
cooperate with the decided regulatory standards. Fujikura et. al. state,

Of course, industry has at times fiercely remonstrated against
governmental policies that it deem ed scientifically unsound or
economically onerous. Yet basically the interchange has been in spirit
a partnership. Indeed, this cooperative pattern is also evident within
and between industries, despite keen economic competition.189

A more unified system, such as produced by Japan's tight network of
business and government, obviously has an advantage in imposing and
overseeing environmental regulations. Fujikura et. al. state that, “One of the
most striking aspects of the Japanese administration’s approach to enforcement
surely must be the apparent reliance on negotiation and guidance.”190 In the
alternate U.S. example, Tom Eagle of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency states that, “Everything is a battle to get things done at the EPA; a battle
with industry, with the present administration, with Congress, with a deluge of
opposing interests on every side.”191

The previous case study of the

automobile industry illustrates the constantly competing forces in the U.S, and
the effects of this intensely plural and fragmented system. The case study also
illustrates the positive results of Japan’s government and industry working
together in Japan; results exemplified through the N O x study group,
administrative research and development teams, and government research
funding and tax incentives.

189 Adams et. al., p.324.
190 Fujikura et. al., p.261.
191 Tom Eagle, Senior Policy Analyst in the Office of Air Pollution, The United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 5-2-93.

C O N C L U S IO N

Following World W ar II Japan based its re-vamped state on the American
model of a market based constitutional democracy.192 Over the past twenty-five
years the United States and Japan have also adopted similar environmental
policies. However, Japan has achieved an impressive level of environmental
clean-up while the U.S., in comparative terms, has not. Environmental
regulations have not been implemented as successfully in the United States as
they have in Japan. The successful implementation of environmental
regulations in Japan is due primarily to the bureaucracy's ability to control the
formulation of pollution laws and cooperate with industry in their
implementation. Conversely, the implementation of environmental regulations
in the U.S. is characterized by an adversarial relationship between business
and government, within a state that lacks strong institutional powers.
Salem Katsh et. al. describe the business-government relationship in the
U.S.:

An adversarial framework has traditionally governed relations between
public and private sectors in the United States. Rooted in the basic
Jeffersonian ideals, which are suspicious of both 'big business and big
government,' this framework has evolved into a complex of laws and
regulations designed to maintain the independence of, and distance
between, American industry and government officials so that each
sector can serve as a check on the discretionary power of the other.193

Additionally, the U.S. government maintains little command of material
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resources, such as the control of credit, that can be used to offer incentives to
industry.194 Furthermore, the U.S. government plays a marginal role in the
allocation of capital and has relatively little public ownership.195 In this situation
there is little cooperation between industry and government in the U.S.
concerning industrial policy. Environmental policy, in particular, has been
associated with an increase in political conflict between industry and
government; thereby making an already adversarial relationship even more
contentious.196
This adversarial relationship takes place in a highly visible, very
accessible and fragmented political arena. The legislative process in the
United States is extremely pluralistic. Set regulations are based on collected
evidence presented by contending sides and interpreted according to specific
procedures that are open to appeals and challenges at all stages, and in all
arenas. Policy-making in the United States is typically long and contentious,
and often ends in litigation. In terms of environmental policies this process
produces the highest rates of appeals, postponement and litigation in the world,
which of course serves to impede environmental policy and its
implementation.197 It is interesting to note that in response to the stricter
environmental standards since the 1970's, American businesses have hired
more lawyers while Japanese businesses have hired more engineers.198
In contrast, given the close connections linking Japanese government
and business, the Japanese regulatory process is directed through
government-industry cooperation. Most industrial policy decisions in Japan are
based upon negotiation, discussion and consultation. Fujikura et. al. state that,
194 Krasner, p.61.
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"by permitting industry to contribute to identifying and implementing its own
solutions to a problem, administrative guidance contributes significantly to the
effectiveness and fairness of the administrative process."199 The three forces
that have typically served to unify Japan's policy making process are the
leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, the leaders of business, and the elite
bureaucrats. Upham states of this relationship,

The locus of political power was, and remains today, in the constant
formal and informal consultations among these forces and in the strong
personal, political, and economic relationships binding the
representatives of these groups to one another.200

Formal and informal consultation is facilitated by a practice of elite recruitment
from Tokyo University in both the public and private sectors 201 Additionally,
advisory councils and policy clubs bring together officials, politicians, and
industrialists on a regular basis.202 To further this strong business-government
relationship business-oriented ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, retire their top bureaucrats at a
relatively early age, who then often serve as board members for large
companies 203 In these executive positions former Vice-Ministers maintain
close relations with their former ministry subordinates who have often moved
into the vacated government p o s t204 Within this intricate network industry's
interests are incorporated into the policy-making process and, in turn, top
administrative agencies encourage businesses to cooperate with set regulatory
standards. Thus, negotiation and compact are at the core of business-state
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relations in Japan.205
The success of Japan's regulatory policies can be further attributed to the
bureaucracy’s ability to control the formulation of pollution laws and direct their
implementation in a concerted effort with various ministries, such as M ITI and
the Environment Agency, as well as private sector firms. The strength of
Japan's bureaucracy is so sound that even the Liberal Democratic Party's
recent loss of power is believed to have little if any effect over the bureaucracy's
objectives. Karel Van Wolferen, a specialist in Japanese politics, believes that
the crumbling Liberal Democratic Party will not result in politicians wresting
control from the bureaucrats, for given the intricate business-bureaucratic
power, this is hardly possible 206 In fact, Van Wolferen argues that, "an
obstructionist press and political coalitions wrecked by internal strife could
further weaken Japan's politicians and further consolidate bureaucratic and
business-bureaucratic power.”207
Japan's centralized business community is also linked to the state
through the Keiretsu system. Inter-firm trade in Japan is dominated by long
standing networks of reciprocal ties among companies, or groups of firms,
formally identified as Keiretsu.208 Within the Keiretsu, trade, finance, and
corporate control become closely linked 209 Furthermore, the Keidanren, a
membership of more than 100 industry-wide associations, adjusts and mediates
differences of opinion among its various member industries and businesses,
and submits recommendations to the government regarding industrial policy.210
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Thus, the cooperative effort between government and business, and the lack of
fragmentation in the private sector, results in cohesion and centralization. This
stands in stark contrast to the constant conflict between various institutions,
business, and interest groups that typifies U.S. government-business relations.
Additionally, the Japanese government provides a great deal of financial
incentives to promote industry compliance with regulations. If too many
industries are concentrated in one area, the central government subsidizes both
the municipal government and the factory for relocation costs.211 The Japanese
government may also construct an industrial site for the company, or subsidize
the c o s t212 As stated earlier, the government additionally provides tax
incentives and special loans to help businesses comply with regulation codes.
There also exists in Japan the Environmental Pollution Control Service
Corporation, a government owned and operated entity 213 It was established by
the government to effectively control pollution without inhibiting economic
growth. Among its many purposes the Environmental Pollution Control Service
Corporation selects environmentally approved sites for industry, reserves or
builds protected areas, and installs pollution control and abatement
equipm ent214 On a smaller scale, Japanese administrative agencies have
research groups within their agencies to assist the private sector with
development. The U.S. government does not provide similar services for its
industries, nor does it typically give financial incentives to the private sector to
encourage regulatory compliance.
The central feature of American politics is the fragmentation and
dispersion of power and authority. Federalism, the separation of powers
doctrine, judicial review, the absence of a strong party system, a bicameral
211
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Congress, an independent judiciary, and a plethora of interest groups all serve
to exasperate a state system in which power is separated by design. According
to Stephen Krasner, "in comparison with their counter-parts in other industrial
countries, U.S. central decision makers have difficulty extracting the domestic
resources that they need to implement state policies."215
The U.S. bureaucracy, unlike Japan's bureaucracy, is relatively weak. In
comparison with the advanced industrial countries, the U.S. bureaucracy has
great difficulty in formulating and implementing its goals 216 Furthermore, the
U.S. bureaucracy is open to direct infiltration by groups concerned with specific
agency decisions. Thus, the bureaucracy's fragmentation and lack of power
hinders the effective implementation of policy. The United States
Environmental Protection Agency, although a strong U.S. administrative
agency, does not maintain the legislative or implementary power that the
Japanese Ministries, such as M ITI or the Environment Agency hold. As stated
throughout this paper, in Japan the implementation of emission and ambient
standards and the attainment of many other policy objectives depends primarily
on administrative enforcem ent217

Conversely, policy decisions in the U.S. are

made by Congress. Consequently, the EPA does not maintain enough
legislative power to effectively implement or enforce their environmental
regulations.
Krasner contends that the weakest kind of state is one which is
completely perm eated by pressure groups and, of all the industrialized
democracies, the U.S. is probably the closest to this pole of weakness.218 This
state of affairs exists because the United States’ political system is open to
various interests at all levels. Additionally, the American Constitution checks
215 Krasner, p.53.
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government's powers by limiting legal authority in all arenas, dividing power
within the government, and dividing power among groups in society.219
Because institutional powers are separated between the different branches of
government, this system offers little centralized power and leaves few tools with
which to implement policy.
Alternately, Japan is reputed to be among the strongest and most
centralized states in the industrial world 220 These distinctly different
•V

characteristics of both the U.S. and Japan are integral aspects of each state's
history. Each nation's approach to the regulation of industry needs to be
understood within the political and historical context in which it evolved.
As Krasner contends, American society was born modern; it was not
necessary to have a strong state to destroy a traditional society or an
aristocracy 221 America was also an early industrializer; economic change took
place slowly and with relatively little state direction 222 Even through the 1930's,
the U.S. federal government played little direct role in the development of the
nation’s industry's. Compared with other capitalist nations, America's steel,
electric, textile, automobile, and chemical industries grew with relatively little
direct government assistance.223 Hence, the U.S. government's weak role in
industrial affairs is largely a consequence of the political history of America's
industrialization.
Although Japan's vision of a post-war Democratic state was almost
entirely based on the American model, Japan developed its own form of
democracy that reflected the particular history and politics of Japan 224
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220 Samuels, p.9.
221 Krasner, p.62.
222 Krasner, p.62.
223 Vogel, "Government - Industry Relations," p.96.
224 Frank Upham, "Unplaced Persons and Movements," in Andrew Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan
As History. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) p.346.

72

Japan's history led to cooperation between business and government.
Following W W II the extensive involvement of government in industrial
development was decisive in saving the country from economic and political
i

dependence upon the industrial W est and in creating conditions for Japan’s
economic success.225 The legitimacy of this relationship has its historical roots
in the Miji Restoration of 1868, in which economic development was similarly
the state's central goal. The existence and development of this model of
cooperation is not very well understood by Americans. Kahan et. al. state, "Too
few Americans really understand the closely interwoven monolith that rules
Japan. This is not the phantom 'Japan In c. ,'. . . The actual monolith is part and
parcel of Japan’s traditional - that is prewar - ruling elite."226
As a result of these different relationships between business and
government in Japan and the U.S., the implementation of similar environmental
policies takes on distinctly different forms and results in both countries.
Although the U.S. has experienced sound improvements in environmental
quality, Japan has achieved much higher levels of improvement in
environmental quality. Due to the cooperative efforts of industry and
government, Japan is better able to implement its environmental regulations
than the United States. Conversely, stringent environmental regulations have
been established in the U.S., yet many of these standards have never been
met. The most vigorous opposition to environmental objectives in the United
States comes from the business community. In legislative, administrative, and
judicial action, in the mass media, in public relations campaigns, in scientific
and technical claims and data, the private sectors resistance to environmental
regulations is great. Each form of business, be it raw material production,

226 Boyd., p.85.
226 M. Kahan, F.W. Richmond, How To Beat The Japanese At Their Own Game. (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983) p.26.
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manufacturing, commerce, transportation, or construction, has its own particular
objection to environmental regulations. Due to the open nature of the U.S.
system, and the absence of cooperation between business and the state, U.S.
businesses can effectively lobby and litigate environmental regulations to
death.
A pluralistic political system in which legislation is so negotiated,
compromised, and diluted by various interests is a central factor in the often
self-regulatory practices of business in the United States. This situation allows
the private sector in the U.S. to effectively evade stringent environmental
standards. Consequently, it becomes apparent why the Clean Air Act was so
drastically weakened. The irony of this situation is that there is a much stronger
environmental movement in the U.S. than in Japan. A 1990 Gallup poll showed
that 76% of American's consider themselves environmentalists.227 However,
because of its historically cooperative state-business relationship, Japan has
been able to formulate and implement rigorous environmental regulations and
achieve a level of environmental cleanup that is superior to the United States.

Recommendations
Japan
The Japanese government obviously has the ability to pass strong
regulatory policy as well as the ability to achieve private sector compliance.
The existence of organization and cooperation between business and the
bureaucracy is at the root of Japan's regulatory success. In short, the Japanese
state is essentially capable of making decisions and of enforcing them once
these decisions are m ade.228 This capability is clearly seen in Japan's success
227 Christopher Bosso, "Adaptation and Change in the Environmental Movement," in Allan Cigler
and Burdett Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics. (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
1991) p. 156.
228 Pempel, p. 16.
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with its Clean Air Act and with pollution abatement in general.
Unfortunately, unless people are dropping dead in the street from
pollution, environmental policy remains a value question; what aspects of the
physical environment are important, and why? The question becomes, does
the physical environment, as well as plant and animal species, have an intrinsic
value in and of themselves? Japan does not always seem to think so. Japan
has the capability of enforcing strong environmental policies, yet apart from
pollution abatement the Japanese government and society choose to limit their
environmental policy making. In the areas of environmental protection, the
preservation of scenic or rare environments, and the protection of endangered
plant and animal species, Japan’s environmental record is w eak if not
controversial. The continued debate over commercial whaling is a primary
example of this fact. Whaling is considered by most developed countries to be
cruel, unnecessary, and ecologically threatening, yet Japan’s whaling industry
remains in existence, and Japan continually fights for international access to
this trade. To the present day Japan is attempting to revoke the international
ban on commercial whaling of the Minke whale, even though this species has
only recently been removed from international endangered species lists. The
U.S. on the other hand has opposed commercial whaling for over a decade,
and continues to oppose this practice in other countries.
As stated in the opening of this paper, the 1977 Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development reviewed the environmental policies
of Japan and their apparent success. The O E C D ’s report was highly
complimentary of Japan’s efforts towards, and great success with, pollution
clean up. However, the concluding comments of the report addressed Japan’s
need to consider environmental policy in a broader context. The report stated
that although Japan had succeeded with pollution abatement, the policies
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ignored environmental “amenities” such as beauty, quietness, privacy, and
other un-measurable elements such as these.229

Pollution problems can be

defined: pollution levels can be measured and pollution sources can be
identified. Alternately, amenities are difficult to measure or define quantitatively
in order to designate levels of improvement. Japan’s environmental policies
were and are specifically focused towards pollution abatement, this
concentrated effort is significant in the success of this goal.
Japan seem s to act only upon environmental issues that directly effect
the health of its population or the efficiency of the Japanese society. This is the
greatest disappointment concerning Japan’s environmental agenda. Japan
has the capability and political power to affect significant environmental
changes, to achieve pollution abatem ent as well as environmental and species
preservation, yet for the most part both Japan’s citizens and the government
choose to forgo a broad approach to environmental policy. Thus, in the case of
Japan it is recommended that the application of pollution problems be extended
to apply to a more comprehensive environmental agenda.

The U n ite d S ta te s
If the United States were to decide that it wished to reach the air quality
emission standards and overall environmental success that Japan has
achieved through its regulatory system it would have to learn from the practices
of Japan’s policy implementations. Specifically, administrative agencies in the
U.S should be allotted more regulatory power, interest group access should be
restricted, and most importantly the U.S. public and private sectors must work
together in an attempt to achieve environmental goals and regulatory
compliance. More specifically, the Environmental Protection Agency, rather

229 Pempel, p.252.
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than Congress, would have to establish strict emission standards and
compliance schedules through scientific and technical consultation. This would
have to be done in absence of interest group recommendations, either business
or environmental. Following the establishment of emission standards, the EPA
would have to work with the private sector and the government to design an
implementation program. This program would necessarily include financial
incentives, such as loans, tax reductions for compliance, and government
research and development funding. By increasing the EPA’s implementation
and regulatory responsibility the regulatory process would be centralized,
thereby allowing the EPA to practice its political mandate and eliminate the
many cleavages used to bypass environmental policy and achieve private
sector self regulation in the United States. Although these suggestions do not
entail an entire overhaul of the U.S. political system, they would require limits to
interest group access, increased bureaucratic responsibility and power, and
most importantly a cooperative business-government effort focused upon
achieving substantial private sector compliance to environmental regulations.
Furthermore, although environmental interest groups remain forceful,
they are too fragmented and diverse and have too many contending forces, to
successfully achieve their various goals. In fact there are many environmental
interest groups that encompass identical platforms, yet compete with one
another for funding and political access. Additionally, the ability of non-profit
organizations to compete with wealthy private sector interests is very limited in
such a plural political system. If a more united force existed for environmental
issues, the presence of environmental groups would be more politically
powerful. In short, environmental groups should combine efforts when possible
and perhaps even merge organizations. In relation to this problem, Mancur
Olsen states in the Rise an d Fall o f Nations, that when a nation such as the
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United States is so overrun with various interests and interests groups, they all
pull any significant political effort apart. Consequently, no substantial policy can
be created or implemented, the political system is stagnated, and the nation
eventually faces decline.230 In this case greater restrictions on lobbying are in
order. This mandate would curb private sector powers by limiting some
avenues (perhaps financial) of political access, as well as encourage
environmental groups into organizing a more united effort. Restrictions would
not eliminate or obstruct public access to the policy making process, they would
simply lend more organization to the political process, and perhaps give well
organized environmental interest groups more legitimacy.
Most importantly, the United States public and private sectors must
attempt to cooperate in order to achieve improved environmental conditions.
The United States environmental movement has remained popular since the
1960’s. However, a united effort from the government and industry in terms of
environmental policy has not been evident.

As business-government

cooperation is at the core of Japan's success with environmental policy, the
U.S. must learn from their example. In order to achieve a cooperative
relationship the U.S. government and industry must realize that environmental
policies can be financially sound policies. The global market for
environmentally friendly products is worth an estimated $200 billion dollars a
year, and is growing tremendously 231

Which country wins the race to perfect

and sell green technologies will depend to a large degree on who has the best
engineering and marketing skills 232

But equally important may be the

encouragement that companies get from their government. Governments can

230 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth. Stagflation, and Social
Rigidities. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
231 Michael Lemonick, "The Big Green Payoff," Time, June 1,1992, p.62. .
232 Lemonick, p.62.

exert enormous influence over how aggressively businesses take the
environment into account, using tough standards in connection with incentives
and rewards. The U.S government has done a relatively poor job of
encouraging business to innovate. Fortunately, some U.S. companies, such as
3M Corporation (Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing) realized, without the
government's help, that being environmentally conscious can also lead to
growth. 3M has drastically reduced pollution and waste at its manufacturing
plants, and despite the conventional wisdom that says environmentalism is a
luxury, has steadily increased profits as a result of the company’s environmental
efforts.233
“Once industrialists think about it seriously, they almost inevitably see the
financial advantages of investments in environmental technology,” says Hugh
Faulkner, executive director of the Business Council for Sustainable
D evelopm ent234 Yet, continues Faulkner, even with greater industrial
environmental consciousness,

There could clearly be no prospect for sustainable development in
either the developed or the developing world without government
incentives. The nations that wield those carrots and sticks most
skillfully will be the leaders of the new green revolution, and their
industries will eventually be the ones to profit from it.235

This is a fact that Japan seems to have realized, but the United States has yet
to accept.

A report from the World Resources Institute says that the U.S. has

fallen far behind in the effort to develop “green” technologies 236 The report
also addresses the Japanese government’s long standing belief that “private
firms benefit from assistance in endeavors of long-term strategic importance

233
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and that a future economic payoff will materialize from providing it.”237 The
question is, with Japan and W estern Europe continually striving for
environmentally sound industries, what international position will the United
States hold once these countries have increased their efficiency and growth to
a point where the U.S. is no longer a supplier; no longer a competitor. Apart
from the environmental implications, certainly the economic results are already
apparent.
There are some recent signs that the United States government is
initiating some cooperative efforts with business. Recently, the Clinton
administration released a blueprint for reducing greenhouse gases, proposing
ways for companies to gradually cut back on their levels of greenhouse gas
emissions. The plan outlines more than 50 projects in which industry and
federal agencies can cooperate in cutting emissions 238

The provisions call for

such actions as suggesting that employers offer cash vouchers rather than
subsidize parking with the intent of encouraging the use of public transportation.
The problem with this cooperative effort is that most of the provisions rely on
voluntary participation by private industry; very few provisions are actually
mandatory. Furthermore, this plan involves little legislation and virtually no new
spending 239 Therefore, there is very little incentive for industry to participate
and no punishment if they choose not to. W hile Clinton’s effort to encourage
government and business' efforts is on the right track, it cannot prove to be
significantly effective if the effort lies solely on federal suggestions and voluntary
compliance. Future environmental policy in the United States must consist of
more than this. If the U.S. public and private sectors wish to cooperate towards
environmental goals environmental policy must include stringent standards
237 Lemonick, p.62.
238 "Clinton Sets Plan to Cut Emissions," The New York Times, Oct. 18,1993, p. A1.
239 "Clinton Sets Plan to Cut Emissions," p.A1.
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accompanied by research and development aid and financial incentives
designed to encourage companies to reach these standards.

Market Based Environmental Policy
Aside from imposing restrictions on lobbying, increasing the EPA's
regulatory powers, or altering the U.S. constitutional order, there are few means
by which the United States can follow Japan's example of efficient
environmental policy making and its implementation. Japan has been more
successful with environmental regulations due to the strength of its
bureaucracy, the state’s economic powers, and historically strong businessgovernment relations. There are many elements of Japan's success that cannot
be transferred to the U.S. system such as historical business-government ties,
inter-firm ties, and a government with a powerful bureaucracy that can direct the
economy. Perhaps the U.S should not attempt to look towards Japan’s
example, but instead explore alternatives to regulatory policy that would work
with the U.S political-economic traditions instead of against them.
It is important to remember that U.S. industries are not paying the real
cost of producing their goods, they instead expect the public and the
government to absorb the cost of cleaning up their waste. If a company was
expected to pay for its pollution, emissions would most likely be minimized.
There are two recent suggestions from the economic community aimed at
controlling pollution through the use of free market ideals. O ne approach is to
tax pollution. For example, a tax per pound on a pollutant emitted could be
imposed on power plants and other industries. A tax could even be imposed on
automobile emissions based on each car’s expected emissions, further based
on actual emission levels.240 The other approach that economists recommend
240 Steven E. Rhoads, The Economist's View of the World: Governments. Markets and Public
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is a tradable discharge license. The regulatory agencies could determine the
total amount of emissions to be allowed in an area and then issue permits or
licenses for these emissions. The permits would be bought and sold like
industrial property by companies.241 If a firm would rather buy another
company’s excess discharge license on a specific contaminant rather than
install new equipment, this would be possible. This makes it financially sound
for a firm to emit less pollutants in order to sell its excess license 242
Unfortunately, these recommended methods do not serve to reduce
pollution as much as they serve to effectively control or enforce pollution. Yet,
economists argue that past and current environmental legislation has been
postponed, revised and evaded by the Congress, the courts, and the EPA.
W hile an effort to reduce pollution levels is optimally desired, controlling
pollution is preferable to the current rise in pollution. These suggestions would
serve to enforce existing legislation by making emissions costly to a firm.
Excess emissions would result either in higher taxes, or in tying up money in
costly emissions permits. Their point should be well taken and seriously
considered.
Both of these suggested market based mechanisms have an advantage
over the existing regulatory system in their ability to rechannel self-interest so
that it becomes congruent with environmental policy.243 Put simply, emissions
would cost firms a great deal of money. As previously stated, emissions would
result in either higher taxes or in tying up money in costly emissions permits.
W hen economic incentives have changed, many firms will find it profitable to
clean up their emissions rather than to delay cleaning up by fighting the EPA.244
Policy. (New
241 Rhoads,
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Additionally, these proposals would cut down on litigation. As it stands now if
delay saves a company more than it loses in court costs, the company has an
incentive to appeal at every stage, even if it thinks it will eventually lose.245
Under the tax scheme a company would owe back taxes if it lost and there
would also be less to litigate. Since the EPA would not be requiring each firm to
meet a certain standard for emission or to install a particular technology by a
particular date, the courts would not have to determine whether the EPA's rules
for each firm were reasonable 246 Or, under the license suggestion, the court
would find that the Congress has determined that it wants air or water of a given
cleanliness. To get it requires limiting emissions to the level indicated by the
emissions licenses. If a firm believes it must go to unreasonable and
disproportionately great expense to clean up, the court can easily point out that
the firm has the alternative of buying a marketable license from one of the firms
with proportionately lower costs 247
These plans each propose achieving industrial compliance through and
within the current market system using market incentives. This is particularly
attractive considering the U.S. private and public sector's strong free market
principles. Furthermore, these proposals require no changes in the current
political system, they instead use the market based economic system.
Additionally, under the current regulatory system once a firm is in compliance it
has no incentive to still do better. With the incentive schemes the possibility of
increasing profits by reducing pollutants remains, as long as any taxes are paid
or capital is tied up in marketable effluent licenses.248 Thus, not only is
compliance reached under the market incentive system, but innovations aimed
at continually improving environmental quality and reducing emissions are
245
246
247
248
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encouraged as well.
An alternative to environmental regulations is available through market
based incentives for industrial compliance. By using free market incentives to
entice industrial compliance, the present regulation system would be reformed
and hopefully improved. As this study shows, the U.S. is not as well equipped
to achieve environmental standards through regulation as Japan, perhaps for
the United States free market environmentalism is a sound solution.
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